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The
Federalist No. 10 (James Madison)
More
so than Federalist No. 51, Federalist No. 10 addresses
the ability of the new government to guard against domestic
faction and insurrection. One of the most significant
aspects of this government is its ability to control
factions. Madison acknowledges that factions have always
existed, and will continue to exist, among men. "The
latent causes of faction are thus sewn in the nature
of man . . . ." By nature, men possessing
a zeal for different opinions on religion unite together,
attach themselves to ambitious leaders and "vex and
oppress each other . . . ." Madison
recognizes that such factions cannot be stopped. The
goal of modern government should be to control the effects
of faction, rather than the cause. As Madison explains,
the proposed republican form of government will prevent
the ability of factions to unite in a majority whereby
the rights of the minority are oppressed. The representative
nature of the legislature, coupled with the separation
of governmental powers, achieve the purpose of government
— controlling the effect of factions. In addition, the
sheer size of the territory governed prevents any real
opportunity to unite in an unjust cause. Thus, "[a]
religious sect may degenerate into a political faction
and a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects
that disbursed over the entire face of it must secure
the national councils against any danger from that source."
RJ&L
Religious Institutions Group
The
Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against
Domestic Faction and Insurrection.
From
the New York Packet
Friday,
November 23, 1787
To
the People of the State of New York:
AMONG
the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union,
none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency
to break and control the violence of faction. The friend
of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed
for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their
propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore,
to set a due value on any plan which, without violating
the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper
cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced
into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal
diseases under which popular governments have everywhere
perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful
topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their
most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made
by the American constitutions on the popular models, both
ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired;
but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend
that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this
side, as was wished and expected. Complaints are everywhere
heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally
the friends of public and private faith, and of public and
personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable,
that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of
rival parties, and that measures are too often decided,
not according to the rules of justice and the rights of
the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested
and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish
that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of
known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in
some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a candid
review of our situation, that some of the distresses under
which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation
of our governments; but it will be found, at the same time,
that other causes will not alone account for many of our
heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing
and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm
for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the
continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly,
effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious
spirit has tainted our public administrations.
By
a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting
to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united
and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest,
adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent
and aggregate interests of the community.
There
are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the
one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its
effects.
There
are again two methods of removing the causes of faction:
the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to
its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the
same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.
It
could never be more truly said than of the first remedy,
that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction
what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly
expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty,
which is essential to political life, because it nourishes
faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air,
which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to
fire its destructive agency.
The
second expedient is as impracticable as the first would
be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible,
and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions
will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between
his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions
will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the
former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves.
The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights
of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle
to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties
is the first object of government. From the protection of
different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the
possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately
results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments
and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division
of the society into different interests and parties.
The
latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of
man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees
of activity, according to the different circumstances of
civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning
religion, concerning government, and many other points,
as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to
different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence
and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes
have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn,
divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual
animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and
oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good.
So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual
animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents
itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have
been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and
excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common
and durable source of factions has been the various and
unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those
who are without property have ever formed distinct interests
in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors,
fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing
interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with
many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized
nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated
by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these
various and interfering interests forms the principal task
of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party
and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of
the government.
No
man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his
interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably,
corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason,
a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at
the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts
of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not
indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning
the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the
different classes of legislators but advocates and parties
to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning
private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are
parties on one side and the debtors on the other. Justice
ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties
are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous
party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must
be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged,
and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures?
are questions which would be differently decided by the
landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by neither
with a sole regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment
of taxes on the various descriptions of property is an act
which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet
there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity
and temptation are given to a predominant party to trample
on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they
overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their
own pockets.
It
is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able
to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all
subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will
not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such
an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect
and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over
the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding
the rights of another or the good of the whole.
The
inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of
faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be
sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS.
If
a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied
by the republican principle, which enables the majority
to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog
the administration, it may convulse the society; but it
will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the
forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in
a faction, the form of popular government, on the other
hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest
both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To
secure the public good and private rights against the danger
of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the
spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great
object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that
it is the great desideratum by which this form of government
can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so
long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption
of mankind.
By
what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of
two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest
in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the
majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must
be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable
to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression.
If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide,
we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can
be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found
to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals,
and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined
together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes
needful.
From
this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure
democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small
number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government
in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction.
A common passion or interest will, in almost every case,
be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and
concert result from the form of government itself; and there
is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker
party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such
democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and
contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal
security or the rights of property; and have in general
been as short in their lives as they have been violent in
their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized
this species of government, have erroneously supposed that
by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political
rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized
and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and
their passions.
A
republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme
of representation takes place, opens a different prospect,
and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine
the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we
shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy
which it must derive from the Union.
The
two great points of difference between a democracy and a
republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in
the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the
rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater
sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.
The
effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine
and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the
medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best
discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism
and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it
to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation,
it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by
the representatives of the people, will be more consonant
to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves,
convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect
may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices,
or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption,
or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then
betray the interests, of the people. The question resulting
is, whether small or extensive republics are more favorable
to the election of proper guardians of the public weal;
and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two
obvious considerations:
In
the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small
the republic may be, the representatives must be raised
to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals
of a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be
limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the
confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives
in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the
two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the
small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit
characters be not less in the large than in the small republic,
the former will present a greater option, and consequently
a greater probability of a fit choice.
In
the next place, as each representative will be chosen by
a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small
republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates
to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections
are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being
more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess
the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established
characters.
It
must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases,
there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will
be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors,
you render the representatives too little acquainted with
all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by
reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to
these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great
and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy
combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests
being referred to the national, the local and particular
to the State legislatures.
The
other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens
and extent of territory which may be brought within the
compass of republican than of democratic government; and
it is this circumstance principally which renders factious
combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the
latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will
be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the
fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently
will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller
the number of individuals composing a majority, and the
smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more
easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression.
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of
parties and interests; you make it less probable that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade
the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive
exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to
discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each
other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that,
where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable
purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in
proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.
Hence,
it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic
has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction,
is enjoyed by a large over a small republic, — is enjoyed
by the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage
consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened
views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local
prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be denied
that the representation of the Union will be most likely
to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in
the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties,
against the event of any one party being able to outnumber
and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased
variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase
this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater
obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the
secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here,
again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable
advantage.
The
influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within
their particular States, but will be unable to spread a
general conflagration through the other States. A religious
sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of
the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over
the entire face of it must secure the national councils
against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money,
for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property,
or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less
apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular
member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is
more likely to taint a particular county or district, than
an entire State.
In
the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore,
we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident
to republican government. And according to the degree of
pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to
be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the
character of Federalists.
PUBLIUS.
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