| 64
F.3d 664 (Table) Unpublished
Disposition (Cite
as: 64 F.3d 664, 1995 WL 499468 (6th Cir.(Ky.))) NOTICE:
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION. (The
Court's decision is referenced in a "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions"
appearing in the Federal Reporter. Use FI CTA6 Rule 28 and FI CTA6 IOP 206 for
rules regarding the citation of unpublished opinions.) United
States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit Rev.
Lloyd YAGGIE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. INDIANA-KENTUCKY
SYNOD, EVANGICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH IN AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee No.
94-5892 Aug.
21, 1995 On
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky,
No. 93-00438; Charles R. Simpson, III, Chief Judge. W.D.Ky.,
860 F.Supp. 1194. AFFIRMED. Before:
CONTIE, RYAN, and SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judges. PER
CURIAM. **1
Plaintiff-Appellant, Lloyd Yaggie, appeals the dismissal for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction of this action against defendant-appellee, the Indiana-Kentucky Synod,
Evangical Lutheran Church in America, for common law defamation resulting from
a conflict within the Resurrection Lutheran Church. FACTS Plaintiff,
Pastor Yaggie, the minister at Resurrection Lutheran Church ("the church") claims
he was defamed by two agents or employees of defendant, Indiana-Kentucky Synod,
during the course of defendant's attempts to reconcile recurring conflicts between
Pastor Yaggie and his parishioners at the church. The turmoil at Resurrection
Lutheran began soon after Pastor Yaggie accepted a "call" to ministry in 1990
and increased in the spring of 1992. At that point the defendant was asked to
intervene in helping the parties mend their differences. In
order to understand the attempts at reconciliation, it is necessary to understand
the structure of the government of the Lutheran Church. Each Lutheran congregation
is incorporated as a not-for-profit entity, governed by either a three or twelve
member Church Council, [FN1] which can adopt a constitution and by-laws, including
provisions for third-party intervention in the case of conflicts between minister
and congregation. Many Lutheran congregations, including Resurrection Lutheran,
also have a Mutual Ministry Committee, whose primary mission is to assist the
minister and occasionally intervene in congregational disputes. Nationally, congregations
within a geographical area are grouped together into synods. Each synod is governed
by a bishop, who oversees all congregations and clergy within the region. Resurrection
Lutheran is part of the Indiana-Kentucky Synod (hereinafter, "IN- KY Synod"),
presided over by Bishop Ralph Kempski. Pastor Lowell Buss is one of four cleric-assistants
to Bishop Kempski. The
conflict that developed between Pastor Yaggie and his parishioners was based on
communication problems and differences in management style. The difficulties were
so grave by the spring of 1992 that the Church Council requested the intervention
of Pastor Buss pursuant to the Council's constitution and bylaws. Pastor Buss
attended a meeting of the Church Council to discuss options for reconciliation
between Pastor Yaggie and Resurrection Lutheran's members. The Council voted to
have Pastor Buss work with the Mutual Ministry Committee to "mediate" between
the two parties. Over the next several weeks, Pastor Buss and the Mutual Ministry
Committee met with members of the congregation who were experiencing difficulties
with Pastor Yaggie. Pastor Buss was given the responsibility of reporting to the
Church Council on the content and progress of these meetings. In
July 1992, Pastor Buss presented to the Mutual Ministry Committee a draft of the
report he proposed to submit to the Church Council. A single paragraph of that
report is the subject of Pastor Yaggie's first defamation claim:
**2
OBSERVATION: A significant number of members have experienced the Pastor as being
"aloof;" as being "the Boss," as being dogmatic; as not being open to the persons
who disagree or have different viewpoints, even to the point of feeling that they
are dismissed from friendship; as not always hearing what the other person is
trying to say; as having particular difficulty in appreciating women as equals;
as one who talks negatively about persons to others (behind their backs), sometimes
close to the point of breaking confidentiality. Pastor
Yaggie opposed the inclusion of this paragraph in the final report to the Church
Council. At his request, the paragraph was deleted and the original draft was
seen only by members of the Mutual Ministry Committee. Following
the failure of this first attempt at reconciliation, the Church Council decided
to employ a second dispute resolution process provided for in the constitutions
of the church and the IN-KY Synod. Resurrection Lutheran requested, and Bishop
Kempski promptly appointed, a three-member Advisory Committee, who pursuant to
the church constitution, met with members of the congregation at twenty-minute
intervals to assess the situation. This Committee then met with Bishop Kempski,
Pastor Yaggie, and Mrs. Yaggie to discuss the meetings and make recommendations
for action. Pastor Yaggie's second claim of defamation is a result of the Advisory
Committee report submitted to the church congregation. He objected to the phrase
"the Advisory Committee recommends that his [Yaggie's] intention to resign be
honored...." Yaggie asserts this language is defamatory and inaccurate. Pastor
Yaggie's third and final claim concerns a statement allegedly uttered by Bishop
Kempski concerning the meaning of the report. Pastor Yaggie asserts that when
Bishop Kempski was asked about the Committee's recommendation "that appropriate
consultation for professional development and personal healing be offered," he
responded by saying, "It means Pastor Yaggie's going to Saint Barnabas for psychiatric
treatment and evaluation." Pastor Yaggie claims this statement was repeated verbatim
at different church meetings. On
March 23, 1993, plaintiff filed suit in state court. Defendant timely removed
the action to the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky.
Upon defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), the district court dismissed plaintiff's complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the court's intervention was
prohibited by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Plaintiff timely filed this appeal. II. In
dismissing plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the
district court relied on the Supreme Court's opinion in Watson v. Jones,
13 Wall. 679 (1872), in which the Court mandated over a century ago that federal
courts were not to delve into matters concerning the inner ecclesiastical workings
of the church. The Court stated:
**3
But it is a very difficult thing where a subject-matter of dispute, strictly and
purely ecclesiastical in its character,--a matter over which the civil courts
exercise no jurisdiction,--a matter which concerns theological controversy, church
discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the
church to the standard of morals required of them,--becomes the subject of its
action. It may be said there, also, that no jurisdiction has been conferred on
the tribunal to try the particular case before it, or that, in its judgment, it
exceeds the powers conferred upon it or that the laws of the church do not authorize
the particular form of proceeding adopted; and in a sense often used in the courts,
all of those may be said to be questions of jurisdiction. Watson
v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 733, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1872). Since
the opinion in Watson, the Supreme Court has consistently refused to address
church controversy. In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, etc. v. Milivojevich,
426 U.S. 696 (1976), the Court cited Watson for the proposition that federal
courts lack jurisdiction to investigate whether proceedings pursuant to internal
regulations of the church are procedurally or substantively defective. Id.
at 711. The Serbian Court declined to interfere with the decision of the
Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church to suspend and ultimately remove a bishop
of the church, stating: Consistently
with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, "civil courts do not inquire whether
the relevant [hierarchical] church governing body has power under religious law
[to decide such disputes].... Such a determination ... frequently necessitates
the interpretation of ambiguous religious law and usage. To permit civil courts
to probe deeply enough into the allocation of power within a [hierarchical] church
so as to decide...religious law [governing church policy]...would violate the
First Amendment in much the same manner as civil determination of religious doctrine. Id.
at 708-09. It is thus firmly established that in the absence of fraud, collusion,
or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely
ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted as conclusive in
litigation before the secular courts. Gonzalez v. Archbishop, 280 U.S.
1 (1929). The general rule is that federal courts should be loath to assert jurisdiction
over internal church disputes. Serbian, 426 U.S. at 709-10; Presbyterian
Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969). Based
on these cases, the district court in the present case stated:
The
importance we glean from each opinion is the [Supreme] Court's extreme reluctance
to interfere with the internal workings of the church. We are also cognizant of
the fact that, in this case, the alleged defamatory statements do not express
any religious principles or beliefs. However, the fact remains that this action
is the result of a conflict confined within the Resurrection Lutheran Church,
concerning the employment relationship of its minister, and addressed in accordance
with the church constitution. As will be discussed, we find these circumstances
dictate our lack of jurisdiction over the matter. **4
The district court reasoned that a minister's employment relationship is governed
by ecclesiastical rule and falls within the type of religious controversy in which
courts do not intervene as mandated by the First Amendment. We
agree. In Lewis v. Seventh Day Adventists Lake Region Conf., 978 F.2d 940,
942 (6th Cir.1992), this court held that civil court jurisdiction over a ministerial
employment dispute is impermissible because such intervention would excessively
inhibit religious liberty in violation of the First Amendment. Only on the rare
occasion when there exists a compelling government interest in the regulation
of public health, safety, and general welfare have courts interfered in ecclesiastical
matters. Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corporation, 494 F.2d 490, 493 (5th Cir.1974).
We do not find such a compelling interest in the present case. The
interaction between a church and its pastor is not only an integral part of church
government, but also all matters touching this relationship are of ecclesiastical
concern. Id. at 493-94. It makes no difference when the ecclesiastical
dispute fails to touch on church or religious doctrine. Id. "Evaluation
of the gifts and graces of a minister must be left to ecclesiastical institutions,"
Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conf., 894 F.2d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1990), and
there is no exception to the bar against interfering with matters of church administration.
Id. Moreover,
this court has previously addressed the issue of whether to exercise federal jurisdiction
over a defamation claim involving a pastor and his church in Hutchison v. Thomas,
789 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1986). In Hutchison, an ordained Methodist minister
challenged his enforced retirement under church disciplinary rules, asserting
claims for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach
of contract. Several hearings had been conducted concerning his ability to relate
properly to his congregation. The plaintiff in Hutchinson alleged that
throughout the proceedings, the defendants misrepresented his church relationships
and defamed him by declaring him "unappointable" due to recurring problems with
local congregations. The Sixth Circuit held that this court could not constitutionally
intervene in such a dispute because the plaintiff's claims related to his employment
and status as a minister of the church. Id. at 396. The action therefore
concerned internal church discipline, faith, and organization, all of which are
governed by ecclesiastical rule, custom or law, which the federal courts lack
jurisdiction to review. Hutchinson
is similar to the present case as plaintiff, Yaggie, in essence, is disputing
an employment decision and this case concerns the intimate relationship between
a pastor and his congregation. In an attempt to resolve an inner church conflict,
Lutheran leadership investigated congregational attitudes toward Pastor Yaggie.
The investigation was done in accordance with the constitutional provisions of
the church, and the alleged defamatory statements were made in connection with
the mediation process and strictly within the confines of the church. The alleged
defamation concerned the minister's current and future employment relationship
with the church. As such, these are matters of ecclesiastical concern, over which
this court has no jurisdiction. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting
defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and is hereby
AFFIRMED. FN1.
Resurrection Lutheran employed a three-member Church Council consisting of a president,
vice president and treasurer. Copr.
© West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works Reprinted from Westlaw with permission of Thomson/West. If you wish to check the currency of this case, you may do so using KeyCite on Westlaw by visiting http://www.westlaw.com/. |
