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S.Ct. 730 28 L.Ed. 1145 (Cite
as: 113 U.S. 703, 5 S.Ct. 730) Supreme
Court of the United States SOON
HING v. CROWLEY,
Chief of Police, etc. March
16, 1885. In
Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California. **731
*704 The petitioner in the court below, the plaintiff in error here, was arrested
by the defendant, who is chief of police of the city and county of San Francisco,
for an alleged violation of an ordinance of the board of supervisors of that municipality,
approved on the eighteenth of June, 1883; and while in custody of the officer
applied to the circuit court of the United States for a writ of habeas corpus,
in order to obtain his discharge. The circuit court refused to issue the writ;
the judges of the court being divided in opinion, and that of the presiding judge
controlling. The
ordinance was adopted to regulate the establishment and maintenance of public
laundries and wash-houses within certain limits of the city and county of San
Francisco. It recited that the indiscriminate establishment of such laundries
and wash-houses, where clothes and other articles were cleansed for hire, endangered
the public health and public safety, prejudiced the wellbeing and comfort of the
community, and depreciated the value of property in their neighborhood. It then
ordained, pursuant to the authority vested in the board, that after its passage
it should be unlawful for any person to establish, maintain, or carry on the business
of a public laundry or a public wash-house within certain designated limits of
the city and county, without having first obtained a certificate of the health
officer of the municipality that the premises were properly and sufficiently drained,
and that all proper arrangements were made to carry on the business without injury
to the sanitary condition of the neighborhood; and also a certificate of the board
of firewardens of the municipality that the stoves, washing and drying apparatus,
and the appliances for heating smoothing-irons were in good condition, and that
their use was not dangerous to surrounding property from fire, and that all proper
precautions were taken to comply with the provisions of the ordinance defining
the fire limits of the city and county, and making regulations concerning the
erection and *705 use of buildings therein. The ordinance requires the
health officer and the board of wardens, upon the application of any one desirous
to open or conduct the business of a public laundry, to inspect the premises in
which it is proposed to carry on the business, in order to ascertain whether they
are provided with proper drainage and sanitary appliances, and whether the provisions
of the fire ordinance have been complied with; and if found satisfactory in all
respects, to issue to the applicant the required certificates, without charge
for the services rendered. Its fourth section declares that no person owning or
employed in a public laundry or a public wash-house within the prescribed limits
shall wash or iron clothes between the hours of 10 in the evening and 6 in the
morning, or upon any portion of Sunday; and its fifth section declares that no
person engaged in the laundry business within those limits shall permit any one
suffering from an infectious or contagious disease to lodge, sleep, or remain
upon the premises. The violation of any of these provisions is declared to be
a misdemeanor, and **732 penalties are prescribed according to the nature
of the offense. The establishing, maintaining, or carrying on the business without
obtaining the certificate is punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000, or
by imprisonment of not more than six months, or by both. Carrying on the business
outside of the hours prescribed, or permitting persons with contagious diseases
on the premises, is punishable by a fine of not less than $5 or more than $50,
or by imprisonment of not more than one month, or by both such fine and imprisonment. The
petitioner was arrested by the chief of police upon a warrant to a police judge
of the municipality, issued upon a complaint under oath, that the petitioner had
washed and ironed clothes in a public laundry within the prescribed limits between
the hours of 10 o'clock in the evening of the twenty- fifth of February, 1884,
and 6 o'clock in the morning of the following day, thereby violating the provisions
of section 4 of the ordinance. The petition for the writ of habeas corpus
presented to the judges of the circuit court sets forth the arrest and detention
*706 of the petitioner by the chief of police, the ordinance under which the
arrest was made, the complaint before the police judge, and the issue of the warrant
under which he was taken into custody. It then proceeds to state that the petitioner
has for several years been engaged in working for hire in a public laundry in
the city and county of San Francisco, and has, in all respects, complied with
the laws of the United States and of California, and the ordinances of the city
and county, except in washing at the hours mentioned; that the business of carrying
on a laundry is a lawful one, in which a large number of the subjects of the emperor
of China have been and are engaged in the said city and county within the limits
prescribed by the ordinance; that there have been for several years great antipathy
and hatred on the part of the residents of that city and county against the subjects
of China residing and doing business there; that such antipathy and hatred have
manifested themselves in various ways and under various forms for the purpose
of compelling the subjects of China to quit and abandon their business and residence
in the city and county and state; that owing to that feeling, and not otherwise,
and not for any sanitary, police, or other legitimate purpose, but in order to
force those subjects engaged in carrying on the business of a laundry in the city
and county of San Francisco to abandon the exercise of their lawful vocation,
and their only means of livelihood, the supervisors passed the ordinance in question;
that the petitioner has been and is earning his living exclusively by working
at washing and ironing for hire, and in order to gain a livelihood is obliged
to work late in the night, and has no other lawful vocation; that on the first
of January, 1884, his employer paid the license collector of the city and county
six dollars, the amount required by the ordinance to obtain a license to carry
on the business of a laundry, and obtained from him a license to carry on the
business at a designated place within the prescribed limits. The petition also
avers that section 4 of the ordinance is in contravention of the provisions of
the Burlingame treaty, and of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of
the United States, in that it deprives them of the equal protection of the laws. *707
On the hearing of the application for the writ certain questions arose upon which
the judges of the circuit court were divided in opinion. They are as follows:
(1) Whether section 4 of the ordinance mentioned is void on the ground that it
is not within the police power of the board of supervisors of the city and county
of San Francisco. (2) Whether said section is void on the ground that it discriminates
between those engaged in the laundry business and those engaged in other classes
of business. (3) Whether said section is void on the ground that it discriminates
between the different classes of persons engaged in the laundry business. (4)
Whether said section is void on the ground that it deprives a man of the right
to labor at all times. (5) **733 Whether said section is void on the ground
that it is unreasonable in its requirements, in restraint of trade, or upon any
other ground apparent upon the face of the ordinance, or appearing in the petition.
The opinion of the presiding judge being that the said section was valid and constitutional,
the application for the writ was denied; and the judgment entered upon the denial
is brought to this court for review. West
Headnotes Labor
Relations k1361 232Ak1361 Municipal
Corporations k611 268k611 Constitutional
Law k88 92k88 An
ordinance prohibiting the doing of work in public laundries in a city between
the hours of 10 o'clock at night and 6 in the morning is not void on the ground
that it deprives a man of the right to work at all times. Municipal
Corporations k611 268k611 Ordinance
making it unlawful to carry on laundry within designated locality is unconstitutional. Municipal
Corporations k613 268k613 The
ordinance of the city of San Francisco, approved June 23, 1883, prohibiting washing
and ironing in public laundries within certain designated limits, and between
the hours of 10 o'clock at night and 6 in the morning, is purely a police regulation,
within the power of the municipality to enact. Municipal
Corporations k626 268k626 Constitutional
Law k211(1) 92k211(1) (Formerly
92k211) An
ordinance, whose provisions are within the police power of a city to enact, will
not be held void on the ground that the motive of its framers was to discriminate
against a certain class, where such motive does not appear from the language of
the ordinance, nor from its enforcement. Constitutional
Law k208(2) 92k208(2) Municipal
Corporations k626 268k626 A
city ordinance declaring that no person owning or employed in a public laundry
"within prescribed limits" shall wash or iron clothes between 10 p. m. and 6 a.
m. is not unconstitutional, as unduly discriminating between different classes
engaged in the laundry business, because its restrictive provisions are confined
to a certain locality. Constitutional
Law k208(6) 92k208(6) Municipal
Corporations k626 268k626 An
ordinance prohibiting the carrying on of a laundry business between 10 p. m. and
6 a. m. does not unduly discriminate between different classes engaged in the
laundry business, because its restrictive provisions are confined to the washing
and ironing of clothes. Constitutional
Law k239(1) 92k239(1) (Formerly
92k239) Municipal
Corporations k626 268k626 An
ordinance, prohibiting the carrying on of a laundry business within certain designated
limits in a city, between the hours of 10 o'clock at night and 6 in the morning,
cannot be objected to because persons engaged in other lines of business are not
required to cease from their labors during the same hours at night. *707
David McClure and Thos. D. Riordan, for plaintiff in error. H.
G. Sieberts, for defendant in error. FIELD,
J. The
ordinance of the board of supervisors of the city and county of San Francisco,
the legislative authority of that municipality, approved on the twenty-fifth of
June, 1883, is similar in its main features to the ordinance under consideration
at this term in Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27; S. C. ante,
357. It differs in the designation of the limits of the district of the city and
county within which its provisions are to be enforced, but not otherwise in any
essential particular. The fourth section is identical in both. The *708
prohibition against labor on Sunday in this section is not involved here, as it
was not in that case; and the provision for the cessation of labor in the laundries
within certain prescribed limits of the city and county during certain hours of
the night is purely a police regulation, which is, as we there said, within the
competency of any municipality possessed of the ordinary powers belonging to such
bodies. Besides, the constitution of California declares that 'any county, city,
town, or township may make and enforce within its limits all such local, police,
sanitary, and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.' Article
11, § 11. And it is of the utmost consequence in a city subject, as San Francisco
is, the greater part of the year to high winds, and composed principally within
the limits designated of wooden buildings, that regulations of a strict character
should be adopted to prevent the possibility of fires. That occupations in which
continuous fires are necessary should cease at certain hours of the night would
seem to be under such circumstances a reasonable regulation as a measure of precaution.
At any rate, of its necessity for the purpose designated the municipal authorities
are the appropriate judges. Their regulations in this matter are not subject to
any interference by the federal tribunals unless they are made the occasion for
invading the substantial rights of persons, and no such invasion is caused by
the regulation in question. As we said in Barbier v Connolly, 'the
same municipal authority which directs the cessation of labor must necessarily
prescribe the limits within which it shall be enforced, as it does the limits
in a city within which wooden buildings cannot be constructed.' No invidious discrimination
is made against any one by the measures adopted. All persons engaged in the same
business within the prescribed limits are treated alike and subjected to similar
restrictions. There
is no force in the objection that an unwarrantable discrimination is made against
persons engaged in the laundry business, because persons in other kinds of business
are not required to cease from their labors during the same hours at night. There
may be no risks attending the business of others; certainly not as great as where
fires are constantly required to carry them on. The specific regulations for one
kind of business, *709 which may be necessary for the protection of the
public, can never be the just ground of complaint because like restrictions are
not imposed upon other business of a different kind. The discriminations which
are open to objection are those where persons engaged in the same business are
subjected to different restrictions, or are held entitled to different privileges
under the same conditions. It is only then that the discrimination can be said
to impair that equal right which all can claim in the enforcement of the laws. But
counsel in the court below not only objected to the fourth section of the ordinance
as discriminating between those engaged in the laundry business and those engaged
in other business, but also as discriminating between **734 different classes
engaged in the laundry business itself. This latter ground of objection becomes
intelligible only by reference to his brief, in which we are informed that the
laundry business, besides the washing and ironing of clothes, involves the fluting,
polishing, bluing, and wringing of them; and that these are all different branches,
requiring separate and skilled workmen, who are not prohibited from working during
the hours of night. This fluting, polishing, bluing, and wringing of clothes,
it seems to us, are incidents of the general business, and are embraced within
its prohibition. But if not incidents, and they are outside of the prohibition,
it is because there is not the danger from them that would arise from the continuous
fires required in washing; and it is not discriminating legislation in any invidious
sense that branches of the same business from which danger is apprehended are
prohibited during certain hours of the night, while other branches involving no
such danger are permitted. The
objection that the fourth section is void on the ground that it deprives a man
of the right to work at all times is equally without force. However broad the
right of every one to follow such calling and employ his time as he may judge
most conducive to his interests, it must be exercised subject to such general
rules as are adopted by society for the common welfare. All sorts of restrictions
are imposed upon the actions of men, notwithstanding the liberty which is guarantied
to each. It is liberty regulated by just and impartial laws. Parties, *710
for example, are free to make any contracts they choose for a lawful purpose,
but society says what contracts shall be in writing and what may be verbally made,
and on what days they may be executed, and how long they may be enforced if their
terms are not complied with. So, too, with the hours of labor. On few subjects
has there been more regulation. How many hours shall constitute a day's work in
the absence of contract, at what time shops in our cities shall close at night,
are constant subjects of legislation. Laws setting aside Sunday as a day of rest
are upheld, not from any right of the government to legislate for the promotion
of religious observances, but from its right to protect all persons from the physical
and moral debasement which comes from uninterrupted labor. Such laws have always
been deemed beneficent and merciful laws, especially to the poor and dependent,
to the laborers in our factories and workshops, and in the heated rooms of our
cities; and their validity has been sustained by the highest courts of the states. The
principal objection, however, of the petitioner to the ordinance in question is
founded upon the supposed hostile motives of the supervisors in passing it. The
petition alleges that it was adopted owing to a feeling of antipathy and hatred
prevailing in the city and county of San Francisco against the subjects of the
emperor of China resident therein, and for the purpose of compelling those engaged
in the laundry business to abandon their lawful vocation and residence there,
and not for any sanitary, police, or other legitimate purpose. There is nothing,
however, in the language of the ordinance, or in the record of its enactment,
which in any respect tends to sustain this allegation. And the rule is general,
with reference to the enactments of all legislative bodies, that the courts cannot
inquire into the motives of the legislators in passing them, except as they may
be disclosed on the face of the acts, or inferable from their operation, considered
with reference to the condition of the country and existing legislation. The motives
of the legislators, considered as to the purposes they had in view, will always
be presumed to be to accomplish that which follows as the natural and reasonable
effect of their enactments. Their *711 motives, considered as the moral
inducements for their votes, will vary with the different members of the legislative
body. The diverse character of such motives, and the impossibility of penetrating
into the hearts of men and ascertaining the truth, precludes all such inquiries
as impracticable and futile. And in the present case, even if the motives of the
supervisors were as alleged, the ordinance would not be thereby changed **735
from a legitimate police regulation, unless in its enforcement it is made to operate
only against the class mentioned; and of this there is no pretense. It
follows that the several questions certified must be answered in the negative
and the judgment be affirmed; and it is so ordered. Copr.
© West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works Reprinted from Westlaw with permission of Thomson/West. If you wish to check the currency of this case, you may do so using KeyCite on Westlaw by visiting http://www.westlaw.com/. |
