| 12
S.Ct. 511 36 L.Ed. 226 (Cite
as: 143 U.S. 457, 12 S.Ct. 511) Supreme
Court of the United States RECTOR,
ETC., OF HOLY TRINITY CHURCH v. UNITED
STATES February
29, 1892 In
error to the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New
York. Reversed. West
Headnotes Aliens
k50 24k50 The
word "labor" as used in the alien labor contract law, 23 Stat. 332, prohibiting
the importation of foreigners under contract to perform labor, etc., means manual
labor as distinguished from that of a professional man, as a clergyman. Aliens
k50 24k50 Although
the alien contract labor law, 23 Stat. 332, prohibits the importation of "any"
foreigners under contract to perform "labor or service of any kind," yet it does
not apply to one who comes to this country under contract to enter the service
of a church as its rector. Statutes
k183 361k183 It
is within the power of courts to declare that a thing which is within the letter
of a statute is not governed by the statute, because not within its spirit or
the intention of its makers. Statutes
k210 361k210 In
the construction of a statute, both the title and preamble may be considered in
doubtful cases. Statutes
k211 361k211 Where
doubt exists as to meaning of a statute, the title may be looked to for aid in
its construction. Statutes
k212 361k212 It
being historically true that the American people are a religious people, as shown
by the religious objects expressed by the original grants and charters of the
colonies, and the recognition of religion in the most solemn acts of their history,
as well as in the constitutions of the states and the nation, the courts, in construing
statutes should not impute to any legislature a purpose of action against religion. Statutes
k215 361k215 In
construing a doubtful statute the court will consider the evil which it was designed
to remedy, and for this purpose will look into contemporaneous events, including
the situation as it existed, and as it was pressed upon the attention of the legislative
body, while the act was under consideration.
**511 *457 Seaman Miller, for plaintiff in error.
Asst. Atty. Gen. Maury, for the United States. Mr.
Justice BREWER delivered the opinion of the court. Plaintiff
in error is a corporation duly organized and incorporated as a religious society
under the laws of the state of New York. E. Walpole Warren was, prior to September,
*458 1887, an alien residing in England. In that month the plaintiff in error
made a contract with him, by which he was to remove to the city of New York, and
enter into its service as rector and pastor; and, in pursuance of such contract,
Warren did so remove and enter upon such service. It is claimed by the United
States that this contract on the part of the plaintiff in error was forbidden
by chapter 164, 23 St. p. 332; and an action was commenced to recover the penalty
prescribed by that act. The circuit court held that the contract was within the
prohibition of the statute, and rendered judgment accordingly, (36 Fed. Rep. 303,)
and the single question presented for our determination is whether it erred in
that conclusion. The
first section describes the act forbidden, and is in these words: 'Be
it enacted by the senate and house of representatives of the United States of
America, in congress assembled, that from and after the passage of this act it
shall be unlawful for any person, company, partnership, or corporation, in any
manner whatsoever, to prepay the transportation, or in any way assist or encourage
the importation or migration, of any alien or aliens, any foreigner or foreigners,
into the United States, its territories, or the District of Columbia, under contract
or agreement, parol or special, express or implied, made previous to the importation
or migration of such alien or aliens, foreigner or foreigners, to perform labor
or service of any kind in the United States, its territories, or the District
of Columbia.' It
must be conceded that the act of the corporation is within the letter of this
section, for the relation of rector to his church is one of service, and implies
labor on the one side with compensation on the other. Not only are the general
words 'labor' and 'service' both used, but also, as it **512 were to guard
against any narrow interpretation and emphasize a breadth of meaning, to them
is added 'of any kind;' and, further, as noticed by the circuit judge in his opinion,
the fifth section, which makes specific exceptions, among them professional actors,
artists, lecturers, singers, and domestic *459 servants, strengthens the
idea that every other kind of labor and service was intended to be reached by
the first section. While there is great force to this reasoning, we cannot think
congress intended to denounce with penalties a transaction like that in the present
case. It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute
and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention
of its makers. This has been often asserted, and the Reports are full of cases
illustrating its application. This is not the substitution of the will of the
judge for that of the legislator; for frequently words of general meaning are
used in a statute, words broad enough to include an act in question, and yet a
consideration of the whole legislation, or of the circumstances surrounding its
enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving such broad meaning
to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator intended to
include the particular act. As said in Stradling v. Morgan, Plow. 205: 'From which
cases it appears that the sages of the law heretofore have construed statutes
quite contrary to the letter in some appearance, and those statutes which comprehend
all things in the letter they have expounded to extend to but some things, and
those which generally prohibit all people from doing such an act they have interpreted
to permit some people to do it, and those which include every person in the letter
they have adjudged to reach to some persons only, which expositions have always
been founded upon the intent of the legislature, which they have collected sometimes
by considering the cause and necessity of making the act, sometimes by comparing
one part of the act with another, and sometimes by foreign circumstances.' In
Pier Co. v. Hannam, 3 Barn. & Ald. 266, ABBOTT, C. J., quotes from Lord Coke
as follows: 'Acts of parliament are to be so construed as no man that is innocent
or free from injury or wrong be, by a literal construction, punished or endangered.'
In the case of State v. Clark, 29 N. J. Law, 96, 99, it appeared that an act had
been passed, making it a misdemeanor to willfully break down a fence in the possession
of another person. Clark was indicted *460 under that statute. The defense
was that the act of breaking down the fence, though willful, was in the exercise
of a legal right to go upon his own lands. The trial court rejected the testimony
offered to sustain the defense, and the supreme court held that this ruling was
error. In its opinion the court used this language: 'The act of 1855, in terms,
makes the willful opening, breaking down, or injuring of any fences belonging
to or in the possession of any other person a misdemeanor. In what sense is the
term 'willful' used? In common parlance, 'willful' is used in the sense of 'intentional,'
as distinguished from 'accidental' or 'involuntary.' Whatever one does intentionally,
he does willfully. Is it used in that sense in this act? Did the legislature intend
to make the intentional opening of a fence for the purpose of going upon the land
of another indictable, if done by permission or for a lawful purpose? * * * We
cannot suppose such to have been the actual intent. To adopt such a construction
would put a stop to the ordinary business of life. The language of the act, if
construed literally, evidently leads to an absurd result. If a literal construction
of the words of a statute be absurd, the act must be so construed as to avoid
the absurdity. The court must restrain the words. The object designed to be reached
by the act must limit and control the literal import of the terms and phrases
employed.' In U. S. v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 486, the defendants were indicted for
the violation of an act of congress providing 'that if any person shall knowingly
and willfully obstruct or retard the passage of the mail, or of any driver or
carrier, or of any horse or carriage carrying the same, he shall, upon conviction,
for every such offense, pay a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars.' The specific
charge was that the defendants knowingly and willfully retarded the passage of
one Farris, a carrier of the mail, while engaged in the performance of his duty,
and also in like manner retarded the steam-boat Gen. Buell, at that time engaged
in carrying the mail. To this indictment the defendants pleaded specially that
Farris had been indicted for murder by a court of competent authority in Kentucky;
that a bench-warrant had been issued and *461 placed in the hands of the
defendant Kirby, the sheriff of the county, commanding him to arrest Farris, and
bring him before the court to answer to the indictment; and that, in obedience
to this warrant, he and the other defendants, as his posse, entered upon the steamboat
Gen. Buell and arrested Farris, and used only such force as was necessary to accomplish
that arrest. The question as to the sufficiency of this plea was certified to
this court, and it was held that the arrest of Farris upon the warrant from the
state court was not an obstruction of the mail, or the retarding of the passage
of a carrier of the mail, within the meaning of the act. In its opinion the court
says: 'All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms should be
so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an
absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature
intended exceptions to its language which would avoid results of this character.
The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter. The common
sense of man approves the judgment mentioned by Puffendorf, that the Bolognian
law which enacted 'that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with
the utmost severity,' did not extend to the surgeon who opened the vein of a person
that fell down in the street in a fit. The same **513 common sense accepts
the ruling, cited by Plowden, that the statute of 1 Edw. II., which enacts that
a prisoner who breaks prison shall be guilty of felony, does not extend to a prisoner
who breaks out when the prison is on fire, 'for he is not to be hanged because
he would not stay to be burnt.' And we think that a like common sense will sanction
the ruling we make, that the act of congress which punishes the obstruction or
retarding of the passage of the mail, or of its carrier, does not apply to a case
of temporary detention of the mail caused by the arrest of the carrier upon an
indictment for murder.' The following cases may also be cited: Henry v. Tilson,
17 Vt. 479; Ryegate v. Wardsboro, 30 Vt. 743; Ex parte Ellis, 11 Cal. 220; Ingraham
v. Speed, 30 Miss. 410; Jackson v. Collins, 3 Cow. 89; People v. Insurance Co.,
15 Johns. 358; Burch v. Newbury, 10 N. Y. 374; People v. *462 Commissioners,
95 N. Y. 554, 558; People v. Lacombe, 99 N. Y. 43, 49, 1 N. E. Rep. 599; Chesapeake
& Ohio Canal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 4 Gill & J. 152; Osgood
v. Breed, 12 Mass. 525, 530; Wilbur v. Crane, 13 Pick. 284; Oates v. Bank, 100
U. S. 239. Among
other things which may be considered in determining the intent of the legislature
is the title of the act. We do not mean that it may be used to add to or take
from the body of the statute, (Hadden v. Collector, 5 Wall. 107,) but it may help
to interpret its meaning. In the case of U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358, 386,
Chief Justice MARSHALL said: 'On the influence which the title ought to have in
construing the enacting clauses, much has been said, and yet it is not easy to
discern the point of difference between the opposing counsel in this respect.
Neither party contends that the title of an act can control plain words in the
body of the statute; and neither denies that, taken with other parts, it may assist
in removing ambiguities. Where the intent is plain, nothing is left to construction.
Where the mind labors to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes everything
from which aid can be derived; and in such case the title claims a degree of notice,
and will have its due share of consideration.' And in the case of U. S. v. Palmer,
3 Wheat. 610, 631, the same judge applied the doctrine in this way: 'The words
of the section are in terms of unlimited extent. The words 'any person or persons'
are broad enough to comprehend every human being. But general words must not only
be limited to cases within the jurisdiction of the state, but also to those objects
to which the legislature intended to apply them. Did the legislature intend to
apply these words to the subjects of a foreign power, who in a foreign ship may
commit murder or robbery on the high seas? The title of an act cannot control
its words, but may furnish some aid in showing what was in the mind of the legislature.
The title of this act is, 'An act for the punishment of certain crimes against
the United States.' It would seem that offenses against the United States, not
offenses against the human race, were the crimes which the legislature intended
by this law to punish.' *463
It will be seen that words as general as those used in the first section of this
act were by that decision limited, and the intent of congress with respect to
the act was gathered partially, at least, from its title. Now, the title of this
act is, 'An act to prohibit the importation and migration of foreigners and aliens
under contract or agreement to perform labor in the United States, its territories,
and the District of Columbia. Obviously the thought expressed in this reaches
only to the work of the manual laborer, as distinguished from that of the professional
man. No one reading such a title would suppose that congress had in its mind any
purpose of staying the coming into this country of ministers of the gospel, or,
indeed, of any class whose toil is that of the brain. The common understanding
of the terms 'labor' and 'laborers' does not include preaching and preachers,
and it is to be assumed that words and phrases are used in their ordinary meaning.
So whatever of light is thrown upon the statute by the language of the title indicates
an exclusion from its penal provisions of all contracts for the employment of
ministers, rectors, and pastors. Again,
another guide to the meaning of a statute is found in the evil which it is designed
to remedy; and for this the court properly looks at contemporaneous events, the
situation as it existed, and as it was pressed upon the attention of the legislative
body. U. S. v. Railroad Co., 91 U. S. 72, 79. The situation which called for this
statute was briefly but fully stated by Mr. Justice BROWN when, as district judge,
he decided the case of U. S. v. Craig, 28 Fed. Rep. 795, 798: 'The motives and
history of the act are matters of common knowledge. It had become the practice
for large capitalists in this country to contract with their agents abroad for
the shipment of great numbers of an ignorant and servile class of foreign laborers,
under contracts by which the employer agreed, upon the one hand, to prepay their
passage, while, upon the other hand, the laborers agreed to work after their arrival
for a certain time at a low rate of wages. The effect of this was to break down
the labor market, and to reduce other laborers engaged in like occupations to
the level *464 of the assisted immigrant. The evil finally became so flagrant
that an appeal was made to congress for relief by the passage of the act in question,
the design of which was to raise the standard of foreign immigrants, and to discountenance
the migration of those who had not sufficient means in their own hands, or those
of their friends, to pay their passage.' It
appears, also, from the petitions, and in the testimony presented before the committees
of congress, that it was this cheap, unskilled labor which was making the trouble,
and the influx of which congress sought to prevent. It was never suggested that
we had in this country a surplus of brain toilers, and, least of all, that the
market for the services of Christian ministers was depressed by foreign competition.
Those were matters to which the attention of congress, or of the people, was not
directed. So far, then, as the evil which **514 was sought to be remedied
interprets the statute, it also guides to an exclusion of this contract from the
penalties of the act. A
singular circumstance, throwing light upon the intent of congress, is found in
this extract from the report of the senate committee on education and labor, recommending
the passage of the bill: 'The general facts and considerations which induce the
committee to recommend the passage of this bill are set forth in the report of
the committee of the house. The committee report the bill back without amendment,
although there are certain features thereof which might well be changed or modified,
in the hope that the bill may not fail of passage during the present session.
Especially would the committee have otherwise recommended amendments, substituting
for the expression, 'labor and service,' whenever it occurs in the body of the
bill, the words 'manual labor' or 'manual service,' as sufficiently broad to accomplish
the purposes of the bill, and that such amendments would remove objections which
a sharp and perhaps unfriendly criticism may urge to the proposed legislation.
The committee, however, believing that the bill in its present form will be construed
as including only those whose labor or service is manual in character, and being
very desirous that the bill become a law before the adjournment, have reported
the bill without *465 change.' Page 6059, Congressional Record, 48th Cong.
And, referring back to the report of the committee of the house, there appears
this language: 'It seeks to restrain and prohibit the immigration or importation
of laborers who would have never seen our shores but for the inducements and allurements
of men whose only object is to obtain labor at the lowest possible rate, regardless
of the social and material well-being of our own citizens, and regardless of the
evil consequences which result to American laborers from such immigration. This
class of immigrants care nothing about our institutions, and in many instances
never even heard of them. They are men whose passage is paid by the importers.
They come here under contract to labor for a certain number of years. They are
ignorant of our social condition, and, that they may remain so, they are isolated
and prevented from coming into contact with Americans. They are generally from
the lowest social stratum, and live upon the coarsest food, and in hovels of a
character before unknown to American workmen. They, as a rule, do not become citizens,
and are certainly not a desirable acquisition to the body politic. The inevitable
tendency of their presence among us is to degrade American labor, and to reduce
it to the level of the imported pauper labor.' Page 5359, Congressional Record,
48th Cong. We
find, therefore, that the title of the act, the evil which was intended to be
remedied, the circumstances surrounding the appeal to congress, the reports of
the committee of each house, all concur in affirming that the intent of congress
was simply to stay the influx of this cheap, unskilled labor. But,
beyond all these matters, no purpose of action against religion can be imputed
to any legislation, state or national, because this is a religious people. This
is historically true. From the discovery of this continent to the present hour,
there is a single voice making this affirmation. The commission to Christopher
Columbus, prior to his sail westward, is from 'Ferdinand and Isabella, by the
grace of God, king and queen of Castile,' etc., and recites that 'it is hoped
that by God's assistance some of the continents and islands in the *466
ocean will be discovered,' etc. The first colonial grant, that made to Sir Walter
Raleigh in 1584, was from 'Elizabeth, by the grace of God, of England, Fraunce
and Ireland, queene, defender of the faith,' etc.; and the grant authorizing him
to enact statutes of the government of the proposed colony provided that 'they
be not against the true Christian faith nowe professed in the Church of England.'
The first charter of Virginia, granted by King James I. in 1606, after reciting
the application of certain parties for a charter, commenced the grant in these
words: 'We, greatly commending, and graciously accepting of, their Desires for
the Furtherance of so noble a Work, which may, by the Providence of Almighty God,
hereafter tend to the Glory of his Divine Majesty, in propagating of Christian
Religion to such People, as yet live in Darkness and miserable Ignorance of the
true Knowledge and Worship of God, and may in time bring the Infidels and Savages,
living in those parts, to human Civility, and to a settled and quiet Government;
DO, by these our Letters-Patents, graciously accept of, and agree to, their humble
and well- intended Desires.' Language
of similar import may be found in the subsequent charters of that colony, from
the same king, in 1609 and 1611; and the same is true of the various charters
granted to the other colonies. In language more or less emphatic is the establishment
of the Christian religion declared to be one of the purposes of the grant. The
celebrated compact made by the pilgrims in the Mayflower, 1620, recites: 'Having
undertaken for the Glory of God, and Advancement of the Christian Faith, and the
Honour of our King and Country, a Voyage to plant the first Colony in the northern
Parts of Virginia; Do by these Presents, solemnly and mutually, in the Presence
of God and one another, covenant and combine ourselves together into a civil Body
Politick, for our better Ordering and Preservation, and Furtherance of the Ends
aforesaid.' The
fundamental orders of Connecticut, under which a provisional government was instituted
in 1638-39, commence with this declaration: 'Forasmuch as it hath pleased the
Allmighty God by the wise disposition of his diuyne pruidence *467 so to
Order and dispose of things that we the Inhabitants and Residents of Windsor,
Hartford, and Wethersfield are now cohabiting and dwelling in and vppon the River
of Conectecotte and the Lands thereunto adioyneing; And well knowing where a people
are gathered togather the word of **515 God requires that to mayntayne
the peace and vnion of such a people there should be an orderly and decent Gouerment
established according to God, to order and dispose of the affayres of the people
at all seasons as occation shall require; doe therefore assotiate and conioyne
our selues to be as one Publike State or Comonwelth; and doe, for our selues and
our Successors and such as shall be adioyned to vs att any tyme hereafter, enter
into Combination and Confederation togather, to mayntayne and presearue the liberty
and purity of the gospell of our Lord Jesus wch we now prfesse, as also the disciplyne
of the Churches, wch according to the truth of the said gospell is now practised
amongst vs.' In
the charter of privileges granted by William Penn to the province of Pennsylvania,
in 1701, it is recited: 'Because no People can be truly happy, though under the
greatest Enjoyment of Civil Liberties, if abridged of the Freedom of their Consciences,
as to their Religious Profession and Worship; And Almighty God being the only
Lord of Conscience, Father of Lights and Spirits; and the Author as well as Object
of all divine Knowledge, Faith, and Worship, who only doth enlighten the Minds,
and persuade and convince the Understandings of People, I do hereby grant and
declare,' etc. Coming
nearer to the present time, the declaration of independence recognizes the presence
of the Divine in human affairs in these words: 'We hold these truths to be self-evident,
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.'
'We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General
Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude
of our intentions, do, in the Name and by Authority of the good People of these
Colonies, solemnly publish and declare,' etc.; 'And for the *468 support
of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the Protection of Divine Providence,
we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor.' If
we examine the constitutions of the various states, we find in them a constant
recognition of religious obligations. Every constitution of every one of the 44
states contains language which, either directly or by clear implication, recognizes
a profound reverence for religion, and an assumption that its influence in all
human affairs is essential to the well-being of the community. This recognition
may be in the preamble, such as is found in the constitution of Illinois, 1870:
'We, the people of the state of Illinois, grateful to Almighty God for the civil,
political, and religious liberty which He hath so long permitted us to enjoy,
and looking to Him for a blessing upon our endeavors to secure and transmit the
same unimpaired to succeeding generations,' etc. It
may be only in the familiar requisition that all officers shall take an oath closing
with the declaration, 'so help me God.' It may be in clauses like that of the
constitution of Indiana, 1816, art. 11, § 4: 'The manner of administering an oath
or affirmation shall be such as is most consistent with the conscience of the
deponent, and shall be esteemed the most solemn appeal to God.' Or in provisions
such as are found in articles 36 and 37 of the declaration of rights of the constitution
of Maryland, (1867:) 'That, as it is the duty of every man to worship God in such
manner as he thinks most acceptable to Him, all persons are equally entitled to
protection in their religious liberty: wherefore, no person ought, by any law,
to be molested in his person or estate on account of his religious persuasion
or profession, or for his religious practice, unless, under the color of religion,
he shall disturb the good order, peace, or safety of the state, or shall infringe
the laws of morality, or injure others in their natural, civil, or religious rights;
nor ought any person to be compelled to frequent or maintain or contribute, unless
on contract, to maintain any place of worship or any ministry; nor shall any person,
otherwise competent, be deemed incompetent as a witness or juror on account of
his religious belief: provided, he *469 believes in the existence of God,
and that, under his dispensation, such person will be held morally accountable
for his acts, and be rewarded or punished therefor, either in this world or the
world to come. That no religious test ought ever to be required as a qualification
for any office of profit or trust in this state, other than a declaration of belief
in the existence of God; nor shall the legislature prescribe any other oath of
office than the oath prescribed by this constitution.' Or like that in articles
2 and 3 of part 1 of the constitution of Massachusetts, (1780:) 'It is the right
as well as the duty of all men in society publicly, and at stated seasons, to
worship the Supreme Being, the great Creator and Preserver of the universe. *
* * As the happiness of a people and the good order and preservation of civil
government essentially depend upon piety, religion, and morality, and as these
cannot be generally diffused through a community but by the institution of the
public worship of God and of public instructions in piety, religion, and morality:
Therefore, to promote their happiness, and to secure the good order and preservation
of their government, the people of this commonwealth have a right to invest their
legislature with power to authorize and require, and the legislature shall, from
time to time, authorize and require, the several towns, parishes, precincts, and
other bodies politic or religious societies to make suitable provision, at their
own expense, for the institution of the public worship of God and for the support
and maintenance of public Protestant teachers of piety, religion, and morality,
in all cases where such provision shall not be made voluntarily.' Or, as in sections
5 and 14 of article 7 of the constitution of Mississippi, (1832:) 'No person who
denies the being of a God, or a future state of rewards and punishments, shall
hold any office in the civil department of this state. * * * Religion **516
morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government, the preservation of
liberty, and the happiness of mankind, schools, and the means of education, shall
forever be encouraged in this state.' Or by article 22 of the constitution of
Delaware, (1776,) which required all officers, besides an oath of allegiance,
to make and subscribe the following declaration: 'I, A. B., do profess *470
faith in God the Father, and in Jesus Christ His only Son, and in the Holy Ghost,
one God, blessed for evermore; and I do acknowledge the Holy Scriptures of the
Old and New Testament to be given by divine inspiration.' Even
the constitution of the United States, which is supposed to have little touch
upon the private life of the individual, contains in the first amendment a declaration
common to the constitutions of all the states, as follows: 'Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof,' etc.,--and also provides in article 1, § 7, (a provision common to many
constitutions,) that the executive shall have 10 days (Sundays excepted) within
which to determine whether he will approve or veto a bill. There
is no dissonance in these declarations. There is a universal language pervading
them all, having one meaning. They affirm and reaffirm that this is a religious
nation. These are not individual sayings, declarations of private persons. They
are organic utterances. They speak the voice of the entire people. While because
of a general recognition of this truth the question has seldom been presented
to the courts, yet we find that in Updegraph v. Com., 11 Serg. & R. 394, 400,
it was decided that, 'Christianity, general Christianity, is, and always has been,
a part of the common law of Pennsylvania; * * * not Christianity with an established
church and tithes and spiritual courts, but Christianity with liberty of conscience
to all men.' And in People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 294, 295, Chancellor KENT,
the great commentator on American law, speaking as chief justice of the supreme
court of New York, said: 'The people of this state, in common with the people
of this country, profess the general doctrines of Christianity as the rule of
their faith and practice; and to scandalize the author of these doctrines is not
only, in a religious point of view, extremely impious, but, even in respect to
the obligations due to society, is a gross violation of decency and good order.
* * * The free, equal, and undisturbed enjoyment of religious opinion, whatever
it may be, and free and decent discussions on any religious *471 subject,
is granted and secured; but to revile, with malicious and blasphemous contempt,
the religion professed by almost the whole community is an abuse of that right.
Nor are we bound by any expressions in the constitution, as some have strangely
supposed, either not to punish at all, or to punish indiscriminately the like
attacks upon the religion of Mahomet or of the Grand Lama; and for this plain
reason, that the case assumes that we are a Christian people, and the morality
of the country is deeply ingrafted upon Christianity, and not upon the doctrines
or worship of those impostors.' And in the famous case of Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs,
2 How. 127, 198, this court, while sustaining the will of Mr. Girard, with its
provision for the creation of a college into which no minister should be permitted
to enter, observed: 'It is also said, and truly, that the Christian religion is
a part of the common law of Pennsylvania.' If
we pass beyond these matters to a view of American life, as expressed by its laws,
its business, its customs, and its society, we find every where a clear recognition
of the same truth. Among other matters note the following: The form of oath universally
prevailing, concluding with an appeal to the Almighty; the custom of opening sessions
of all deliberative bodies and most conventions with prayer; the prefatory words
of all wills, 'In the name of God, amen;' the laws respecting the observance of
the Sabbath, with the general cessation of all secular business, and the closing
of courts, legislatures, and other similar public assemblies on that day; the
churches and church organizations which abound in every city, town, and hamlet;
the multitude of charitable organizations existing every where under Christian
auspices; the gigantic missionary associations, with general support, and aiming
to establish Christian missions in every quarter of the globe. These, and many
other matters which might be noticed, add a volume of unofficial declarations
to the mass of organic utterances that this is a Christian nation. In the face
of all these, shall it be believed that a congress of the United States intended
to make it a misdemeanor for a church of this country to contract for the services
of a Christian minister residing in another nation? *472
Suppose, in the congress that passed this act, some member had offered a bill
which in terms declared that, if any Roman Catholic church in this country should
contract with Cardinal Manning to come to this country, and enter into its service
as pastor and priest, or any Episcopal church should enter into a like contract
with Canon Farrar, or any Baptist church should make similar arrangements with
Rev. Mr. Spurgeon, or any Jewish synagogue with some eminent rabbi, such contract
should be adjudged unlawful and void, and the church making it be subject to prosecution
and punishment. Can it be believed that it would have received a minute of approving
thought or a single vote? Yet it is contended that such was, in effect, the meaning
of this statute. The construction invoked cannot be accepted as correct. It is
a case where there was presented a definite evil, in view of which the legislature
used general terms with the purpose of reaching all phases of that evil; and thereafter,
unexpectedly, it is developed that the general language thus employed is broad
enough to reach cases and acts which the whole history and life of the country
affirm could not have been intentionally legislated against. It is the duty of
the courts, under those circumstances, to say that, however **517 broad
the language of the statute may be, the act, although within the letter, is not
within the intention of the legislature, and therefore cannot be within the statute. The
judgment will be reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings in accordance
with this opinion. Copr.
© West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works Reprinted from Westlaw with permission of Thomson/West. If you wish to check the currency of this case, you may do so using KeyCite on Westlaw by visiting http://www.westlaw.com/. |
