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76
A.2d 207
(Cite
as: 365 Pa. 422, 76 A.2d 207)
Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania,
McKNIGHT
et al.,
v.
BOARD
OF PUBLIC EDUCATION et al.
Nov.
13, 1950.
Reargument
Denied Feb. 6, 1951.
Thomas
A. McKnight and others brought action against the Board
of Public Education and others in mandamus to compel defendants
to issue to the plaintiffs a permit for use of high school
auditorium on Sunday afternoons for purpose of conducting
religious services. The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny
County at No. 1552 January Term, 1949D. rendered judgment
for the defendants, and the plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme
Court, Chidsey, J., held that judicial review of action
of school board was required to be restricted to the reasonableness
thereof and could not encompass consideration of the wisdom
of the action, that in absence of any proof of unreasonableness
or arbitrary or capricious exercise of power by school board,
judgment of school board was required to stand, that burden
of showing abuse of discretion was a heavy burden, and that
there was a failure on the part of plaintiffs to show that
school board exercised its power, unreasonably or arbitrarily.
Judgment affirmed.
West
Headnotes
[1]
Mandamus 172
250k172
Most Cited Cases
Judicial review of action of school board in refusing to
grant permits to any organization to use auditorium of high
school for any religious or sectarian purpose, was required
to be restricted to the reasonableness of the action of
the board, and could not encompass consideration of wisdom
of action taken. 24 P.S. § 7-775.
[2]
Mandamus 79
250k72
Most Cited Cases
[2]
Schools 72
345k72
Most Cited Cases
Whether school property shall be used by any group at all
is a matter resting within discretion of each school board,
and in absence of any proof of unreasonableness on part
of school board in exercising such power, or an arbitrary
or capricious exercise of the power, the judgment of the
board must stand. 24 P.S. § 7-775.
[3]
Mandamus 168(4)
250k168(4)
Most Cited Cases
Burden
of showing that school board abused its discretion in denying
a permit to religious organization to use high school auditorium
on Sunday afternoons, was a heavy burden. 24 P.S. §17-775.
[4]
Mandamus 168(2)
250k168(2)
Most Cited Cases
Where religious organization which was denied right by school
board to use high school auditorium on Sunday afternoons
for religious purposes pursuant to rule of school board,
made no showing that any other group had been permitted
to use the auditorium for religious purposes, religious
organization was not entitled to prevail in mandamus action
to compel school board to issue a permit to the religious
organization for use of the auditorium. 24 P.S. § 7-775.
*423 **208 Walter W. Riehl, Pittsburgh, Hayden C. Covington,
Brooklyn, N. Y., for appellants
.
Mortimer B. Lesher, Solicitor, Pittsburgh, for appellees.
CHIDSEY, Justice.
Thomas A. McKnight, and others, appellants members of the
Jehovah's Witnesses, instituted this action *424 in mandamus
against the members of the Board of Public Education of
the City of Pittsburgh to compel issuance to them of a permit
for the use of the Schenley High School Auditorium on four
Sunday afternoons for the purpose of conducting a series
of public Bible lectures. Appellees filed preliminary objections
to the complaint in mandamus asserting, inter alia, that
the complaint established that the intended use of the premises
was for religious purposes contrary to the effective rule
of the board prohibiting granting of a permit for 'any religious
or sectarian purposes'. This appeal is from the order of
the court below sustaining the preliminary objections and
from entry of judgment for appellees.
The
complaint avers that appellants are Jehovah's Witnesses;
that they had planned a series of regular public talks on
national and international conditions from a Bible standpoint
by chosen speakers in the public school auditorium of Schenley
High School in the City of Pittsburgh; that by letter dated
September 27, 1948, they requested use of said auditorium
for a series of public lectures on four Sunday afternoons,
October 10, 17, 24 and 31 from 1:00 p. m. to 5:00 p. m.
each afternoon; that they offered to pay the prevailing
rental charges; that on September 30, 1948, they were advised
by H. W. Cramblet, assistant secretary of appellee school
board, that it was impossible to grant the request in view
of a rule adopted by the school board which provided: 'Permits
shall not be granted to anyone for any religious or sectarian
purpose'; that denial to them and permission to others to
have use of the same auditorium for public meetings constituted
arbitrary discrimination, denying to appellants the right
of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States, as well as under
the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; that
the laws of Pennsylvania provide for use *425 of school
auditorium as public meeting and **209 assembly places upon
application by responsible citizens and residents of the
community where the school is located; that appellants'
request was in compliance with the statutory requirement;
that appellees had a legal ministerial duty to issue the
requested permit to appellants, but arbitrarily refused
to do so; that denial to appellants of the requested permit
amounts to an unconstitutional application of the Pennsylvania
statute and authorizes said board to permit the use of schools
in an unconstitutional manner; and, that appellants have
no other adequate and complete remedy.
A
writ of alternative mandamus issued forthwith, returnable
November 15, 1948. Subsequent thereto, on November 10, the
return day of the writ of alternative mandamus was extended
to November 22, 1948. Appellees, on November 19, 1948, filed
'Preliminary Objections by Way of Demurrer' averring that
appellants are a religious cult or sect; that the desired
use of the school auditorium facilities was for religious
or sectarian purposes; that there is no averment in the
complaint that others were permitted to use the school auditorium
for the purpose of holding religious or sectarian meetings;
that appellants did not challenge the legality or the reasonableness
of the rule of the board prohibiting the granting of permits
for use of public school buildings for religious or sectarian
purposes; that the laws of Pennsylvania provide, with regard
to the use of school auditoriums as public meeting and assembly
places, that the board of school directors may permit the
use thereof for 'social, recreation, and other purposes,
under such rules and regulations as the Board may adopt';
and, that the complaint clearly discloses that appellees
acted in a legal manner, in compliance with the Constitution
and laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and without
violating any constitutional rights of appellants.
*426 Appellants contend that (1) the words 'and other proper
purposes' include religious and sectarian purposes, and
(2) although the grant of power to the board to permit use
of the auditorium was permissive and not mandatory, denial
of use of the auditorium to appellants while permitting
it to others, although for non-sectarian or non-religious
purposes, effected a denial of equal protection of the laws
in that there could not be conferred on the board 'power
to arbitrarily exclude one class of permissive use of the
auditorium while allowing another class of permissive use.
It was their duty to make the buildings available to all
classes or persons when they were made available to any
one group for meeting purposes.'
Appellees
contend that (1) religious and sectarian purposes are not
within the scope of the words 'social, recreation, and other
proper purposes'; and (2) the rule represents a proper exercise
of discretion.
The
Act of May 18, 1911, P.L. 309, § 627, as amended by the
Act of March 31, 1927, P.L. 87, [FN1] is the source of the
power exercised by appellees. This Act provides: 'The board
of school directors of any district may permit the use of
its school grounds and buildings for social, recreation,
and other proper purposes, under such rules and regulations
as the board may adopt, and shall make such arrangements
with any city, borough, or township authorities for the
improvement, care, protection, and maintenance of school
buildings and grounds for school, park, play, or other recreation
purposes, as it may see proper, and any board of school
*427 directors may make such arrangements as it may see
proper with any officials or individuals for the temporary
use of school property for schools, playgrounds, social,
recreation, or other proper educational purposes, primaries
and elections.'
FN1.
This Act was specifically repealed by the Act of March
10, 1949, P.L. 30, art. XXVII, § 2701. It has been reenacted
almost verbatim by art. VII, § 775 of that Act, and
further amended by the Act of April 14, 1949, P.L. 460,
§ 2, April 21, 1949, P.L. 702, § 1, and May 12, 1949,
P.L. 1278, § 1, 24 P.S. § 7-775.
[1]Pursuant to the above provisions of the School Code,
appellees adopted Section 416 of its rules and regulations
quoted above. The legislature has delegated to the board
of school directors of any school **210 district the power
to permit use of the school grounds and buildings for certain
proper purposes under such rules and regulations as the
board may adopt. Judicial review of the actions of a board
must be restricted to the reasonableness thereof. Regan
v. Stoddard, 361 Pa. 469, 65 A.2d 240; Commonwealth ex rel.
Hetrick Sunbury School District, 335 Pa. 6, 6 A.2d 279;
Wilson v. School District of City of Philadelphia, 328 Pa.
225, 195 A. 90. It cannot encompass consideration of the
wisdom of the action taken.
[2]Whether
the school property shall be used by any group at all is
a matter resting within the discretion of each board of
school directors. This court is not a superboard of school
directors in performance of an official duty. The legislature
has delegated this power to the school boards, not to the
courts. In the absence of any proof of unreasonableness
or an arbitrary or capricious exercise of the power, the
judgment of the board must stand.
[3]Appellants
do not deny the existence of the discretion in the use of
the power. They contend, however, that permission must be
given to all or none, and that exercise of the power cannot
be partial, but must be complete. There is nothing in the
statute, nor do we know of any rule of statutory construction
which supports such a contention. To the contrary, the principle
is so well established as to need no citation of authority
*428 that unless the delegation of power to a given body
or person contains specific restrictive language, no obligation
or requirement is imposed requiring that the power be exercised
in full or not at all. Exercise of less than the full power
may be successfully challenged only where it can be shown
that it has been exercised in an arbitrary, capricious,
or discriminatory manner. The burden of showing such clear
abuse of discretion is a heavy one.
[4]Appellants,
in their complaint, have failed to sustain this burden.
The complaint does not contain any averment that any group
has been accorded use of the premises for religious and
sectarian purposes. A finding that any other person or persons
similarly situated has been permitted the use which has
been denied to appellants could not properly be made. There
is nothing in the complaint which would warrant a finding
that the exercise of the power by the school board was unreasonable
or arbitrary.
In holding that no facts have been averred in the complaint
establishing abuse of discretion by the board, it becomes
unnecessary to determine at this time the scope of the words
'and other proper purposes', and 'other proper educational
purposes'.
Judgment affirmed.
Pa.
1951
Copr.
© West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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