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29 L.Ed. 680
U.S.
Supreme Court
GIBBONS
v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
116
U.S. 404, 6 S.Ct. 427
Filed
January 18, 1886
Appeal
from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
West
Headnotes
District
of Columbia k3
132k3
Congress,
as a local legislature for the District of Columbia, and
levying taxes for district purposes, may wholly exempt from
taxation certain classes of property, or tax them at a lower
rate than other property.
Taxation
k244
371k244
for
Act
Cong. March 3, 1875, c. 162 (18 Stat. 503), authorizing
the levy of taxes for the support of the government of the
District of Columbia, exempts from taxation "church buildings
and grounds actually occupied by such buildings," but provides
that, if any portion of any building or grounds shall be
used to secure a rent or income, or for any business purpose,
such portion shall be taxed against the owner. Acts July
12, 1876, c. 180, and March 3, 1877, c. 117 (19 Stat. 85,
399), are to the same effect, though differing somewhat
in form. Held, that where a church was built at one end
of a piece of land, so as to enable the ecclesiastical authorities
to derive an income from the lease or sale of the lots at
the other end, such lots were not exempt from taxation,
though a part of the inclosure in which the church stood.
*405
**427 M. F. Morris, for appellant, James Gibbons.
A.
G. Riddle, for the District of Columbia.
GRAY,
J.
*404
This is an appeal from a decree dismissing a bill in equity
by the Roman Catholic archbishop of the diocese of Baltimore,
of which the District of Columbia is a part, to clear the
title of lots numbered 36 to 46, inclusive, (being the lots
formerly numbered 5, 6, and 7,) in square 376, in the city
of Washington, from a cloud created by the assessment and
sale thereof for taxes amounting, with interest, to more
than $5,000. The case was heard upon the bill, answer, a
general replication, and the deposition of the pastor of
St. Patrick's church, from which the facts appeared to be
as follows: The lots in question front south on F street
about 170 feet, *405 and have a depth varying from
about 93 feet to about 114 feet. They were conveyed by Anthony
Caffray in 1804 to the Roman Catholic bishop of Baltimore
in fee 'for the use of the Roman Catholic congregation worshiping
in the place called 'St. Patrick's Church,' in the city
of Washington;' and thence forward, until 1870, were occupied
by the old St. Patrick's church. During that period the
church inclosure included about one-half of square 376,
bounded south by F street, west by Tenth street, and north
by G street. In 1870 the old church building was found to
be unsafe, and in 1872 it was taken down. Since 1870, and
pending the completion of a new church now in process of
erection, the congregation has worshiped in Carroll hall,
on G street, within the same half square, and separated
from the lots in question by a 30-foot passageway. The new
church fronts on Tenth street, with a strip of open ground
**428 about 35 feet wide on its south side and in the
rear for light and ventilation, all to the north of the
lots in question. The reason for so placing the church,
instead of putting it in the middle of the inclosure, was
to enable a revenue to be derived from the sale or lease
of these lots to pay off the church debt incurred in building;
and it was not necessary for the enjoyment of the church
that these lots should remain vacant. In February, 1881,
the plaintiff obtained a decree in equity, authorizing him
to sell or otherwise dispose of these lots, and to apply
the proceeds to the completion of the new church building;
and about that time he made leases thereof for 25 years
to private persons. From 1804 until June 30, 1875, no taxes
were assessed on these lots. Afterwards, until June 30,
1880, they were annually assessed for taxes and sold for
non-payment thereof. The annual taxes since that time have
been paid.
*406
The only matter in contest is the validity of the taxes
assessed upon the lots on F street for the five years between
June 30, 1875, and June 30, 1880, under the annual acts
of congress of March 3, 1875, c. 162, and July 12,
1876, c. 180, and of the permanent act of March 3,
1877, c. 117, authorizing the levy of taxes for the
support of the government of the District of Columbia, the
material provisions of which are as follows: The eighth
section of each of these statutes exempts from taxation
houses for the reformation of offenders, almshouses, buildings
devoted to art or belonging to institutions of purely public
charity, 'church buildings, and grounds actually occupied
by such buildings,' houses to improve the condition of seamen
or soldiers, free public library buildings, and cemeteris.
The act of 1875 adds: 'The lands or grounds appurtenant
to any said house or building, so far as reasonably needed
and actually used for the convenient enjoyment of any said
house or building for its legitimate purpose and no other;
but if any portion of any said building, house, grounds,
or cemetery, so in terms excepted, is used to secure a rent
or income, or for any business purpose, such portion of
the same, or a sum equal in value to such portion, shall
be taxed against the owner of said building or grounds.'
18 St. 503. The acts of 1876 and 1877 substitute for this
addition a provision to the same effect, though differing
somewhat in form, as follows: 'But if any portion of any
such building, house, grounds, or cemetery, so in terms
excepted, is larger than is reasonably needed, [in the act
of 1876; 'absolutely required,' in the act of 1877,] and
actually used for its legitimate purpose, and none other,
or is used to secure a rent or income, or for any business
purpose, such portion of the same, or a sum equal in value
to such portion, shall be taxed against the owner of said
building or grounds.' 19 St. 85, 399.
Upon
the construction most favorable to the appellant, these
statutes exempt nothing from taxation beyond church buildings
and grounds actually occupied for such buildings, and the
lands or grounds appurtenant to any such building, so far
as reasonably needed and actually used for its convenient
enjoyment for its legitimate purpose. Even parts of the
exempted buildings *407 and lands, if used to secure
a rent or income, or for any business purpose, are taxable.
But land which is neither actually occupied for a church
building, nor reasonably needed and actually used for the
convenient enjoyment of the building as a church, is not
exempt from taxation, whether it is used for any other purpose
or not. We are not disposed to deny that grounds left open
around a church, not merely to admit light and air, but
also to add to its beauty and attractiveness, may, if not
used or intended to be used for any other purpose, be exempt
from taxation under these statutes. But upon the uncontroverted
facts of the present case, it was not only unnecessary for
the enjoyment of the church that the F street lots should
remain vacant, but the very reason for placing the church
to the northward of these lots, instead of putting it in
the middle of the whole land controlled by the ecclesiastical
authorities, was to enable a revenue to be derived from
the lease or sale of **429 these lots. Under such
circumstances, these lots were not exempt from taxation,
even before they had been actually so leased.
The
objection, taken in argument, that the act of March 3, 1877,
is unconstitutional, because it provides that the tax upon
all lands within the District of Columbia, outside of the
cities of Washington and Georgetown, and held and used solely
for agricultural purposes, shall be a dollar and a quarter
on the hundred, and upon all other real and personal property
in the District, not expressly exempted, a dollar and a
half on the hundred, is founded on a misunderstanding of
the case of Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat.
317. The point there decided was that an act of congress,
laying a direct tax throughout the United States in proportion
to the census directed to be taken by the constitution,
might comprehend the District of Columbia; and the power
of congress, legislating as a local legislature for the
district, to levy taxes for district purposes only, in like
manner as the legislature of a state may tax the people
of a state for state purposes, was expressly admitted, and
has never since been doubted. 5 Wheat. 318; Welch
v. Cook, 97 U. S. 541; Mattingly v. District
of *408 Columbia, Id. 687. In the exercise of
this power, congress, like any state legislature unrestricted
by constitutional provisions, may, at its discretion, wholly
exempt certain classes of property from taxation, or may
tax them at a lower rate than other property. Decree affirmed.
Reprinted from Westlaw with permission of Thomson/West. If you wish to check the currency of this case, you may do so using KeyCite on Westlaw by visiting http://www.westlaw.com/.
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