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189
S.E. 427
55
Ga.App. 123
(Cite
as: 189 S.E. 427)
Court
of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 1.
COLEMAN
v.
CITY
OF GRIFFEN.
No.
25695.
Sept. 17, 1936.
On
Rehearing.
Syllabus
by the Court.
1.
Restraints upon the free exercise of religion according
to the dictates of conscience are unlawful under our state
and national constitutions. "No external authority is to
place itself between the finite being and the Infinite when
the former is seeking to render the homage that is due,
and in a mode which commends itself to his conscience and
judgment as being suitable for him to render, and acceptable
to its object. [But 'religious liberty does not include
the right to introduce and carry out every scheme or purpose
which persons see fit to claim as a part of their religious
system. No one can stretch his liberty so as to interfere
with that of his neighbor, or violate police regulations
or the penal laws of the land, enacted for the good order
and general welfare of all the people.']" 2 Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations (8th Ed.), 968.
2.
An ordinance passed by the City of Griffin, declaring "that
the practice of distributing, either by hand or otherwise,
circulars, hand-books, advertising, or literature of any
kind, whether said articles are being delivered free, or
whether same are being sold within the city limits of the
City of Griffin, without first obtaining written permission
from the city manager of the City of Griffin, shall be deemed
a nuisance, and punishable as an offense against the City
of Griffin," does not deprive the defendant of his constitutional
right of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, even though it prohibits him from introducing
and carrying out a scheme or purpose which he sees fit to
claim as a part of his religious system. "A party's religious
belief cannot be accepted as a justification for his committing
an overt act made criminal by the law of the land."
Error
from Superior Court, Spalding County; Wm. E. H. Searcy,
Jr., Judge.
Spencer Coleman was convicted in the Recorder's Court of
the City of Griffin of violation of a city ordinance, the
Superior Court refused to sanction his petition for certiorari,
and he brings error.
Affirmed.
West
Headnotes
Constitutional
Law 84.5(16)
92k84.5(16)
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly
92k84)
Accused's distribution of religious literature and advertisements
therefor held violative of ordinance forbidding distribution
of literature of any kind without obtaining city manager's
permission, notwithstanding that accused distributed literature
as result of religious conviction that such distribution
was commanded by God.
Constitutional
Law 84.5(16)
92k84.5(16)
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly
92k84)
Ordinance
prohibiting distribution of any literature without city
manager's written permission held not violative of constitutional
provisions guaranteeing freedom of worship. Const. art.
1, § 1, par. 12.
Municipal
Corporations 642(3)
268k642(3)
Most Cited Cases
Petition for certiorari to review conviction for distributing
literature in violation of city ordinance requiring written
permission from city manager held too indefinite, in charging
that ordinance was in conflict with due process clause,
as applied to accused, to invoke any ruling on constitutionality
of ordinance. Const.U.S. Amend. 14. *427 Chas. G. Reynolds,
John O. Owen, and C. F. Hutcheson, all of Atlanta, for plaintiff
in error.
W.
H. Connor, Sol. Gen., and J. O. Futral, both of Griffin,
for defendant in error.
MacINTYRE,
Judge.
Coleman
was convicted, in the recorder's court of the City of Griffin,
of a violation of section 1 of an ordinance of said city
which reads as follows: "That the practice of distributing
either by hand or otherwise circulars, hand- books, advertising,
or literature of any kind, whether said articles are being
delivered free, or whether same are being sold within the
city limits of the City of Griffin, without first obtaining
written permission from the city manager of the City of
Griffin, * * * shall be deemed a nuisance, and punishable
as an offense against the City of Griffin." The judge of
the superior court refused to sanction a petition for certiorari,
and the defendant excepted.
At
the trial in the recorder's court, Paul Slaton, a citizen
of Griffin, testified that he knew Mr. Coleman and saw him
in Griffin *428 on March 15, and that Mr. Coleman gave him
a yellow card and asked him if he did not want to buy a
book. Mr. Slaton told him that he did not want to read the
card and he did not want to buy a book, and then Mr. Coleman
gave Mr. Slaton a radio slip. The yellow card was introduced
in evidence. It reads as follows: "The newspapers have had
much to say about Loyalty. The Associated Press, however,
declines to publish the truth regarding this issue. Every
fair-minded person should want to know the true facts. I
would like to leave with you some booklets which discuss
problems affecting you. New political methods are everywhere.
Dictators grab control of the governments and make special
laws. How can you be loyal to all and still be true to God?
The answers in these booklets will help you, because there
is no dodging or side-stepping the issue, but straightforward
Bible answers, which is what you need and want. These three
booklets please read carefully, and by contributing, say,
ten cents you will make it possible to print more of these
which can be placed in the hands of other persons desiring
truth." After the admission of this evidence, the defendant
made a statement admitting that he did not obtain from the
City of Griffin a permit to distribute circulars, handbooks,
advertising, or literature of any kind, and that at the
time he was arrested he was distributing circulars, handbooks,
advertising matter, or literature within the City of Griffin.
He further stated that he did not ask for a permit from
the City of Griffin, because he was sent by Jehovah to do
His work, and that His law is supreme and above every human
law, and to apply for a permit to do His work would be an
act of disobedience to His commandment and it would be an
insult to Almighty God. A copy in full of said statement
is as follows: "I admit that I did not obtain from the city
manager of the City of Griffin a permit to distribute circulars,
hand-books, and advertising, or literature of any kind,
and I further admit that at the time I was arrested by the
police officers of the City of Griffin I was distributing
circulars, handbooks, advertising matter or literature within
the City of Griffin. I am one of Jehovah's witnesses, who
are entirely devoted to God, and who obey His law by publishing
his truth without money consideration. I am a true and sincere
follower of Christ Jesus, who is the Son of Jehovah God.
I have consecrated myself to do the will of God, and to
follow in the footsteps of Jesus. In obedience to the command
of Jehovah I was preaching the gospel of His Kingdom from
house to house when I was arrested. God's command as set
forth in His Holy Word at Isaiah 61: 1, 2; Matthew 10:7,
12; John 18:37; Acts 20: 20; 1 Peter 2:21. If I failed or
neglected to obey these commandments, I would be destroyed.
This is shown in Acts 3:22, 23; which reads as follows:
'For Moses truely said unto the fathers: A prophet shall
the Lord your God raise up unto you of your brethren, like
unto me; him shall ye hear in all things whatsoever he shall
say unto you. And it shall come to pass that every soul
which will not hear that prophet shall be destroyed from
among the people.' I called on the people at their homes
and told them about the kingdom of Jehovah. I displayed
to them books and booklets which contain the message of
the Kingdom, and gave them opportunity to secure this printed
message if they so desired. I further offered to the people
invitations to hear the Kingdom message over the radio.
As I had opportunity I told the people how they could have
a part in the work, either through going forth to the people
with the message or by making a small contribution to assist
in carrying the message forward. The message is too important
and the time is too short to cover the whole work in a few
words; hence the message of facts concerning Jehovah's kingdom
and giving the scriptural authority. This enables the people
to sit quietly in their own homes and to inform themselves
of and concerning the real meaning of present-day world
distress, and of the kingdom that will bring relief. Under
the authority of Jehovah I am a duly ordained and authorized
minister of the gospel, and it is incumbent upon me, in
obedience to God's law, to preach the gospel. I worship
Jehovah God by obeying His commandments. God's work, the
Bible, commands all who worship him in spirit and in truth
to go from place to place and tell others about Him and
His Kingdom. At the time I was arrested I was going from
house to house in obedience to His word, and according to
the dictates of my own conscience. I did not ask for a permit
from the police department because I am sent by Jehovah
to do His work. His law is supreme and above every human
law. To apply for a permit to do His work would be an act
of disobedience to His commandment. It would be an insult
to Almighty God, and would in time result in my own *429
destruction. I have no disposition to violate any law, but
must obey God rather than man, and in this way I worship
Him as commanded. Luke 20:25, Acts 3:23, Acts 4:19, Acts
4:34-38. I get the books and booklets to exhibit to the
people from the Watch Tower Society, which is a corporation
organized for the very purpose of preaching the Bible message
in printed form. It publishes the messages of God's kingdom
in book form, to be carried to the people and exhibited
to them for the purpose of informing them of the truth.
The money received is far less than the cost of carrying
on the work. The deficit is made up by voluntary contributions
of men and women who are anxious to preach the gospel of
the Kingdom in obedience to God's commands."
[1][2]
The defendant contends that "The ordinance involved does
not apply to the work of this defendant, for the following
reasons: 1. That the act complained of, and for which defendant
was arrested, was done in obedience to the mandate of the
Most High God, Jehovah, the Creator of the universe, whose
laws and commands are superior to all human laws, ordinances,
statutes or regulations. 2. That to apply said ordinance
to the work of this defendant brings it into conflict with
the provisions of the Constitution of this State [article
1, § 1, par. 12] guaranteeing freedom of worship in accordance
with the dictates of conscience; and further brings said
ordinance into conflict with the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, providing
that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law. 3. That the Supreme
Court of the United States has decreed that 'This is a Christian
nation,' and therefore the nation and all States, counties,
and municipalities are estopped and precluded from interfering
with or regulating the presentation of a Christian message
to the people."
The City of Griffin had the right and power to enact the
ordinance under consideration. It is constitutional and
valid as prescribing a rule of action for all of those who
engage in the practice of distributing either handbills
or other circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature
of any kind, whether said articles are being delivered free
or whether the same are being sold within the city limits
of Griffin. We do not think the defendant's argument is
sound, that because he conscientiously believes that he
is permitted by the law of God to distribute in the City
of Griffin by hand or otherwise, circulars, handbooks, advertising,
or literature of any kind without obtaining the written
permission from the city manager of Griffin, he may violate
with impunity an ordinance declaring it illegal to do so.
A man's religious belief cannot be accepted as a justification
for his committing an overt act made criminal by the laws
of the city. The ordinance which imposes the penalty operates
upon all alike, and interferes with no man's religious belief.
It is directed against the acts and not the beliefs of the
citizen, and a violation thereof cannot be justified by
the contention that it interferes with the religious belief
of the citizen. In Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
25 L.Ed. 244, where the question involved was a polygamous
marriage between two persons commonly known as Mormons,
who had been previously married, this doctrine was laid
down: "A party's religious belief cannot be accepted as
a justification for his committing an overt act, made criminal
by the law of the land." See, also Owens v. State, 6 Okl.Cr.
110, 116, 116 P. 345, 36 L.R.A.(N.S.) 633, Ann. Cas.1913B,
1218.
As
bearing on the question under consideration, we quote the
following from the Reynolds Case, supra: "In our opinion,
the statute immediately under consideration is within the
legislative power of Congress. It is constitutional and
valid as prescribing a rule of action for all those residing
in the Territories, and in places over which the United
States have exclusive control. This being so, the only question
which remains is, whether those who make polygamy a part
of their religion are excepted from the operation of the
statute. If they are, then those who do not make polygamy
a part of their religious belief may be found guilty and
punished, while those who do, must be acquitted and go free.
This would be introducing a new element into criminal law.
Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they
cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions,
they may with practices. Suppose one believed that human
sacrifices were a necessary part of a religious worship,
would it be seriously contended that the civil government
under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice?
Or if a wife religiously believed it was her duty to burn
herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, *430
would it be beyond the power of the civil government to
prevent her carrying her belief into practice? So here,
as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive
dominion of the United States, it is provided that plural
marriages shall not be allowed. Can a man excuse his practices
to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit
this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious
belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to
permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government
could exist only in name under such circumstances."
A
criminal intent is generally an element of crime, but every
man is presumed to intend the necessary and legitimate consequences
of what he knowingly does. The breaking of the law is the
crime. Every act necessary to constitute the crime in this
case was knowingly done, and therefore the crime was knowingly
committed. Ignorance of a fact may sometimes be taken as
evidence of a want of criminal intent, but not ignorance
of the law. That defense of the accused in this case which
is his belief that the law ought not to have been enacted
is not meritorious. It matters not that his belief was a
part of his professed religion; it was still belief, and
belief only. There should be no restraint upon the free
exercise of religion according to the dictates of the conscience.
No external authority should be allowed to place itself
between the finite being and the Infinite when the former
is seeking to render homage that is due, and in a mode which
commends itself to his conscience and judgment as being
suitable for him to render, and acceptable to its object.
2 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 968. But, "Religious
liberty does not include the right to introduce and carry
out every scheme or purpose which persons see fit to claim
as a part of their religious system. No one can stretch
his liberty so as to interfere with that of his neighbor,
or violate police regulations or the penal laws of the land,
enacted for the good order and general welfare of all the
people. Liberty founded by the fathers was not license unrestrained
by law." McMaster v. State, 21 Okl.Cr. 318, 207 P. 566,
568, 29 A.L.R. 292, 295. Prohibiting one from distributing
literature, as stated in the ordinance, without the permission
of the city manager of Griffin, does not deprive him of
his constitutional right of the free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship, even though it prohibits
him from introducing and carrying out a scheme or purpose
which he sees fit to claim as a part of his religious system.
Judgment affirmed.
BROYLES,
C. J., and GUERRY, J., concur.
On
Rehearing.
MacINTYRE, Judge.
[3] Counsel who represent the plaintiff in error on the
rehearing in their brief very frankly state that "the truth
is that counsel who drew the petition for certiorari and
first presented the case in this court had in mind the religious
objections which he strenuously urged. The court has held
that these objections to the constitutionality of the ordinance
were not good. But if, unwittingly perhaps, counsel did
present a good secular objection to the constitutionality
of the ordinance, then the least the court can do is to
enforce that objection to keep a man from going to jail
for a crime he did not commit." (Italics ours.) The italicized
part of counsel's statement is the same construction that
this court put upon the petition for certiorari, that is,
that the objections urged by the plaintiff in error were
the religious objections, and did not go to the question
that the discretion given by the ordinance to the city manager
of Griffin was so arbitrary and uncontrolled that it was
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States. The relevant parts of the petition
for certiorari, which constitute the only record before
this court of the proceedings in the trial court, are as
follows: "4. The ordinance should not be applied to the
work of this defendant, because to so apply it brings it
in conflict with the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution, which provides that no
State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. 5. Petitioner shows that all
questions set forth herein and assigned as error were insisted
upon at the trial of said cause before the recorder." This
charge as to the unconstitutionality of the ordinance, failing
to state wherein the ordinance violates the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, is too indefinite
to invoke any ruling upon the constitutionality of the ordinance.
Jordan v. State, 172 Ga. 857, 159 S.E. 235; Curtis v. Helen,
171 Ga. 256 (2-c, d), 155 S.E. 202. See, also, *431 Palmer
et al. v. Phinizy, 151 Ga. 589, 107 S.E. 852, 591. Irrespective
of what may be the rulings in other states, we feel that
we are bound by the rulings of the Supreme Court of this
state as to when we can consider the unconstitutionality
of an ordinance.
Judgment adhered to.
BROYLES, C. J., and GUERRY, J., concur.
Ga.App.
1936.
Copr.
© West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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