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44 L.Ed. 168
U.S.
Supreme Court
JOSEPH
BRADFIELD, Appt.,
v.
ELLIS
H. ROBERTS, Treasurer of the United States.
175
U.S. 291, 20 S.Ct. 121
No.
76.
Argued
October 27, 1899.
Decided
December 4, 1899.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Court of Appeals of the District
of Columbia reversing the decision of the Supreme Court
in a suit to enjoin the payment of moneys to a hospital
under an appropriation by act of Congress. Affirmed.
See
same case below, 12 App. D. C. 453.
West
Headnotes
Religious
Societies k6
332k6
The
appropriation by Congress of money to a hospital, as compensation
for the treatment and cure of poor patients under a contract,
does not constitute an appropriation to a religious society,
in violation of the constitutional provision against laws
respecting an establishment of religion, where the hospital
is incorporated under an act of Congress, and its property
is acquired in its own name and for its own purposes, and
its business managed in its own way, subject to no visitation,
supervision, or control by any ecclesiastical authority
whatever, although the members of the corporation may be
also members of a church and of a monastic order or sisterhood
of that church, conducting the hospital under its auspices.
**122
*295 Mr. Joseph Bradfield for appellant.
Assistant
Attorney General Hoyt and Attorney General Griggs
for appellee.
**121
Statement by Mr. Justice Peckham:
*292
This is a suit in equity, brought by the appellant to enjoin
the defendant from paying any moneys to the directors of
Providence Hospital, in the city of Washington, under an
agreement entered into between the commissioners of the
District of Columbia and the directors of the hospital,
by virtue of the authority of an act of Congress, because
of the alleged invalidity of the agreement for the reasons
stated in the bill of complaint. In that bill complainant
represents that he is a citizen and taxpayer of the United
States and a resident of the District of Columbia, that
the defendant is the Treasurer of the United States, and
the object of the suit is to enjoin him from paying to or
on account of Providence Hospital, in the city of Washington,
District of Columbia, any moneys belonging to the United
States, by virtue of a contract between the surgeon general
of the army and the directors of that hospital, or by virtue
of an agreement between the commissioners of the District
of Columbia and such directors, under the authority of an
appropriation contained in the sundry civil appropriation
bill for the District of Columbia, approved June 4, 1897.
Complainant
further alleged in his bill:
'That
the said Providence Hospital is a private eleemosynary corporation,
and that to the best of complainant's knowledge and belief
it is composed of members of a monastic order or sisterhood
of the Roman Catholic Church, and is conducted under the
auspices of said church; that the title to its property
is vested in the 'Sisters of Charity of Emmitsburg, Maryland;'
that it was incorporated by a special act of Congress approved
April 8, 1864, whereby, in addition to the usual powers
of bodies corporate and politic, it was invested specially
with 'fully power and all the rights of opening and keeping
a hospital in the city of Washington for the care of such
sick and invalid persons as may place themselves under the
treatment and care of said corporation.'
'That
in view of the sectarian character of said Providence Hospital
and the specific and limited object of its creation, the
said contract between the same and the surgeon general of
the army and also the said agreement between the same
and *293 the commissioners of the District of Columbia
are unauthorized by **122 law, and, moreover, involve
a principle and a precedent for the appropriation of the
funds of the United States for the use and support of religious
societies, contrary to the article of the Constitution which
declares that Congress shall make no law respecting a religious
establishment, and also a precedent for giving to religious
societies a legal agency in carrying into effect a public
and civil duty which would, if once established, speedily
obliterate the essential distinction between civil and religious
functions.
'That
the complainant and all other citizens and taxpayers of
the United States are injured by reason of the said contract
and the said agreement, in virtue whereof the public funds
are being used and pledged for the advancement and support
of a private and sectarian corporation, and that they will
suffer irreparable damage if the same are allowed to be
carried into full effect by means of payments made through
or by the said defendant out of the Treasury of the United
States, contrary to the Constitution and declared policy
of the government.'
The
agreement above mentioned, between the commissioners of
the District of Columbia and the directors of Providence
Hospital, is annexed to the bill, and is as follows:
'Articles
of agreement entered into this sixteenth day of August,
in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-seven,
by the between the commissioners of the District of Columbia
and the directors of Providence Hospital, a body corporate
in said District, whereby it is agreed on the part of the
commissioners of the District of Columbia----
'That
they will erect on the grounds of said hospital an isolating
building or ward for the treatment of minor contagious diseases,
said building or ward to be erected without expense to said
hospital, except such as it may elect, but to be paid out
of an appropriation for that purpose contained in the District
appropriation bill approved March 3, 1897, on plans to be
furnished by the said commissioners, and approved by the
health officer of the District of Columbia, and that when
the said building or ward is fully completed it shall be
truned *294 over to the officers of Providence Hospital,
subject to the following provisions:
'First.
That two thirds of the entire capacity of said isolating
building or ward shall be reserved for the use of such poor
patients as shall be sent there by the commissioners of
the District from time to time through the proper officers.
For each such patient said commissioners and their successors
in office are to pay at the rate of two hundred and fifty
dollars ($250) per annum, for such a time as such patient
may be in the hospital, subject to annual appropriations
by Congress.
'Second.
That persons able to pay for treatment may make such arrangements
for entering the said building or ward as shall be determined
by those in charge thereof, and such persons will pay the
said Providence Hospital reasonable compensation for such
treatment, to be fixed by the hospital authorities, but
such persons shall have the privilege of selecting their
own physicians and nurses, and in case physicians and nurses
are selected other than those assigned by the hospital,
it shall be at the expense of the patient making the request.
'And
said Providence Hospital agrees to always maintain a neutral
zone of forty (40) feet around said isolating building or
ward and grounds connected therewith to which patients of
said ward have access.
'As
witness the signatures and seals of John W. Ross, John B.
Wight, and Edward Burr, acting commissioners of the District
of Columbia, and the corporate seal of the said The Directors
of Providence Hospital and the signature of president thereof,
this sixteenth day of August, A. D. 1897.'
The
contract, if any, between the directors and the suregeon
general of the army is not set forth in the bill, and the
contents or conditions thereof do not in any way appear.
The
defendant demurred to the bill on the ground that the complainant
had not in and by his bill shown any right or title to maintain
the same; also upon the further ground that the complainant
had not stated such a case as entitled him to the relief
thereby prayed or any relief as against the defendant.
*295
Complainant joined issue upon the demurrer, and at a term
of the supreme court of the District of Columbia the demurrer
was overruled and the injunction granted as prayed for.
26 Wash. Law Rep. 84. Upon appeal to the court of appeals
of the District the judgment was reversed, and the case
remanded to the supreme court, with directions to dismiss
the bill. 12 App. D. C. 453. Whereupon the complainant appealed
to this court.
Mr.
Joseph Bradfield for appellant
Assistant
Attorney General Hoyt and Attorney General Griggs
for appellee.
Mr.
Justice Peckham, after stating the facts, delivered the
opinion of the court:
Passing
the various objections made to the maintenance of this suit
on account of an alleged defect of parties, and also in
regard to the character in which the complainant sues, merely
that of a citizen and taxpayer of the United States and
a resident of the District of Columbia, we come to the main
question as to the validity of the agreement between the
commissioners of the District and the directors of the hospital,
founded upon the appropriation contained in the act of Congress,
the contention being that the agreement if carried out would
result in an appropriation by Congress of money to a religious
society, thereby violating the constitutional provision
which forbids Congress from passing any law respecting an
establishment of religion. Art. 1 of the Amendments to Constitution.
The
appropriation is to be found in the general appropriation
act for the government of the District of Columbia, approved
**123 March 3, 1897, 29 Stat. at L. 665, 679, chap.
387. It reads: 'For two isolating buildings, to be constructed,
in the discretion of the commissioners of the District of
Columbia, on the grounds of two hospitals, and to be operated
as a part of such hospitals, thirty thousand dollars.' Acting
under the *296 authority of this appropriation the
commissioners entered into the agreement in question.
As
the bill alleges that Providence Hospital was incorporated
by an act of Congress approved April 8, 1864 (13 Stat.
at L. 43, chap. 50), and assumes to give some of its provisions,
the act thus referred to is substantially made a part of
the bill, and it is therefore set forth in the margin. [FN<<
dagger>>]
FN<<dagger>>
An Act to Incorporate Providence Hospital of the City
of Washington, District of Columbia.
Be
it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
That Lucy Gwynn, Teresa Angela Costello, Sarah McDonald,
Mary E. Spalding, and Mary Calloll, and their successors
in office, are hereby made, declared, and constituted
a corporation and body politic, in law and in fact,
under the name and style of the directors of Providence
Hospital, and by that name they shall be and are hereby
made capable in law to sue and be sued, to plead and
be impleaded, in any court within the county of Washington,
in the District of Columbia; to have and use a common
seal, and to alter or amend the same at pleasure; to
have, purchase, receive, possess, and enjoy any estate
in lands, tenements, annuities, goods, chattels, monyes,
or effects, and to grant, devise, or dispose of the
same in such manner as they may deem most for the interest
of the hospital: Provided, That the real estate
held by said corporation shall not exceed in value the
sum of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars. Sec.
2. And be it further enacted, That the said corporation
and body politic shall have full power to appoint from
their own body a president and such other officers as
they may deem necessary for the purposes of their creation;
and in case of the death, resignation, or refusal to
serve, of any of their number, the remaining members
shall elect and appoint other persons in lieu of those
whose places may have been vacated; and the said corporation
shall have full power and all the rights of opening
and keeping a hospital in the city of Washington for
the care of such sick and invalid persons as may place
themselves under the treatment and care of the said
corporation. Sec. 3. And be it further enacted,
That the said corporation shall also have and enjoy
full power and authority to make such by-laws, rules,
and regulations as may be necessary for the general
accomplishment of the objects of said hospital: Provided,
That they be not inconsistent with the laws in force
in the District of Columbia: And provided, further,
That this act shall be liable to be amended, altered,
or repealed, at the pleasure of Congress.
The
act shows that the individuals named therein and their successors
in office were incorporated under the name of 'The Directors
of Providence Hospital,' with power to *297 receive,
hold, and convey personal and real property, as provided
in its 1st section. By the 2d section the corporation was
granted 'full power and all the rights of opening and keeping
a hospital in the city of Washington for the care of such
sick and invalid persons as may place themselves under the
treatment and care of the said corporation.' The 3d section
gave it full power to make such by-laws, rules, and regulations
that might be necessary for the general accomplishment of
the objects of the hospital, not inconsistent with the laws
in force in the District of Columbia. Nothing is said about
religion or about the religious faith of the incorporators
of this institution in the act of incorporation. It is simply
the ordinary case of the incorporation of a hospital for
the purposes for which such an institution is generally
conducted. It is claimed that the allegation in the complainant's
bill, that the said 'Providence Hospital is a private eleemosynary
corporation, and that to the best of complainant's knowledge
and belief it is composed of members of a monastic order
or sisterhood of the Roman Catholic Church, and is conducted
under the auspices of said church; that the title to its
property is vested in the Sisters of Charity of Emmitsburg,
Maryland,' renders the agreement void for the reason therein
stated, which is that Congress has no power to make 'a law
respecting a religious establishment,' a phrase which is
not synonymous with that used in the Constitution, which
prohibits the passage of a law 'respecting an establishment
of religion.'
If
we were to assume, for the purpose of this question only,
that under this appropriation an agreement with a religious
corporation of the tenor of this agreement would be invalid,
as resulting indirectly in the passage of an act respecting
an establishment of religion, we are unable to see that
the complainant in his bill shows that the corporation is
of the kind described, but on the contrary he has clearly
shown that it is not.
The
above-mentioned allegations in the complainant's bill do
not change the legal character of the corporation or render
it on that account a religious or sectarian body. Assuming
*298 that the hospital is a private eleemosynary corporation,
the fact that its members, according to the belief of the
complainant, are members of a monastic order or sisterhood
of the Roman Catholic, and the further fact that the hospital
is conducted under the auspices of said church, are wholly
immaterial, as is also the allegation regarding the title
to its property. The statute provides as to its property
and makes no provision for its being held by anyone other
than itself. The facts above stated do not in the least
change the legal character of the hospital, or make a religious
corporation out of a purely secular one as constituted by
the law of its being. Whether the individuals who compose
the corporation under its charter happen to be all Roman
Catholics, or all Methodists, or Presbyterians, or Unitarians,
or members of any other religious organization, or of no
organization at all, is of not the slightest consequence
with reference to the law of its incorporation, nor can
the individual **124 beliefs upon religious matters
of the various incorporators be inquired into. Nor is it
material that the hospital may be conducted under the auspices
of the Roman Catholic Church. To be conducted under the
auspices is to be conducted under the influence or patronage
of that church. The meaning of the allegation is that the
church exercises great and perhaps controlling influence
over the management of the hospital. It must, however, be
managed pursuant to the law of its being. That the influence
of any particular church may be powerful over the members
of a nonsectarian and secular corporation, incorporated
for a certain defined purpose and with clearly stated powers,
is surely not sufficient to convert such a corporation into
a religious or sectarian body. That fact does not alter
the legal character of the corporation, which is incorporated
under an act of Congress, and its powers, duties, and character
are to be solcly measured by the charter under which it
alone has any legal existence. There is no allegation that
its hospital work is confined to members of that church
or that in its management the hospital has been conducted
so as to violate its charter in the smallest degree. It
is simply the case of a secular corporation being managed
by people *299 who hold to the doctrines of the Roman
Catholic Church, but who nevertheless are managing the corporation
according to the law under which it exists. The charter
itself does not limit the exercise of its corporate powers
to the members of any particular religious denomination,
but, on the contrary, those powers are to be exercised in
favor of anyone seeking the ministrations of that kind of
an institution. All that can be said of the corporation
itself is that it has been incorporated by an act of Congress,
and for its legal powers and duties that act must be exclusively
referred to. As stated in the opinion of the court of appeals,
this corporation 'is not declared the trustee of any church
or religious society. Its property is to be acquired in
its own name and for its own purposes; that property and
its business are to be managed in its own way, subject to
no visitation, supervision, or control by any ecclesiastical
authority whatever, but only to that of the government which
created it. In respect, then, of its creation, organization,
management, and ownership of property it is an ordinary
private corporation whose rights are determinable by the
law of the land, and the religious opinions of whose members
are not subjects of inquiry.'
It
is not contended that Congress has no power in the District
to appropriate money for the purpose expressed in the appropriation,
and it is not doubted that it has power to authorize the
commissioners of the District of Columbia to enter into
a contract with the trustees of an incorporated hospital
for the purposes mentioned in the agreement in this case,
and the only objection set up is the alleged 'sectarian
character of the hospital and the specific and limited object
of its ereation.'
The
other allegations in complainant's bill are simply statements
of his opinion in regard to the results necessarily flowing
from the appropriation in question when connected with the
agreement mentioned.
The
act of Congress, however, shows there is nothing sectarian
in the corporation, and 'the specific and limited object
of its creation' is the opening and keeping a hospital in
the city of Washington for the care of such sick and invalid
persons as *300 may place themselves under the treatment
and care of the corporation. To make the agreement was within
the discretion of the commissioners, and was a fair exercise
thereof.
The
right reserved in the third section of the charter to amend,
alter, or repeal the act leaves full power in Congress to
remedy any abuse of the charter privileges.
Without
adverting to any other objections to the maintenance of
this suit, it is plain that complainant wholly fails to
set forth a cause of action, and the bill was properly dismissed
by the Court of Appeals, and its decree will therefore be
affirmed.
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