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21
F.3d 184
64 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 633,
64 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 42,953
(Cite
as: 21 F.3d 184)
United
States Court of Appeals,
Seventh
Circuit
Darreyl
N. YOUNG, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
The
NORTHERN ILLINOIS CONFERENCE OF UNITED METHODIST CHURCH,
The Board of
Ordained
Ministry and R. Sheldon Duecker, as the Presiding Bishop
of the Board
of
Ordained Ministry, Defendants-Appellees.
No.
93-2157
Argued
Jan. 4, 1994
Decided
April 7, 1994
African-American
woman who served as probationary minister for church brought
Title VII action against church, alleging that church's
denial of appointment as "elder" and its discontinuance
of her minister status constituted sex and race discrimination.
The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois, Eastern Division, Charles R. Norgle, Sr., J.,
818 F.Supp. 1206, dismissed on First Amendment grounds.
Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals, Kanne, Circuit
Judge, held that First Amendment precluded civil review
of church's employment decisions and procedures.
Affirmed.
West
Headnotes
[1]
Federal Courts k776
170Bk776
Dismissal
of Title VII action would be reviewed de novo, where dismissal
was based on trial court's constitutional ruling that First
Amendment denied it subject matter jurisdiction. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 1.
[2]
Constitutional Law k84.5(10)
92k84.5(10)
[2]
Religious Societies k27(2)
332k27(2)
Religious
bodies may make apparently arbitrary decisions affecting
employment status of their clergy members and be free from
civil review having done so. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
[3]
Civil Rights k143
78k143
[3]
Constitutional Law k84.5(10)
92k84.5(10)
Free
Exercise Clause of First Amendment precluded jurisdiction
over Title VII action brought by African-American woman
who had served as probationary minister for church, where
she alleged that church engaged in race and sex discrimination
when it denied her application for appointment as "elder"
and discontinued her minister status, and that it failed
to follow its own procedures in doing so. Civil Rights Act
of 1964, § 701, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
1.
*184
Gerald A. Goldman, Arthur R. Ehrlich (argued), Goldman &
Marcus, Chicago, IL, for plaintiff-appellant.
Gregory
N. Freerksen, Samuel W. Witwer, Jr. (argued), Jennifer Kae
Poltrock, Witwer, Burlage, Poltrock & Giampietro, Chicago,
IL, for defendants- appellees.
Before
FAIRCHILD, MANION, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.
KANNE,
Circuit Judge.
Darreyl
Young is a black female. After several years serving as
a probationary minister of the United Methodist Church,
she applied for a promotion to the position of "Clergy Member
in Full Connection" or "Elder." A review panel of the Northern
Illinois Conference of the United Methodist Church denied
her request for a promotion and terminated her employment
on March 4, 1992.
She
notified the EEOC of her termination. It found no probable
cause to proceed against the United Methodist Church. [FN1]
It issued her a right to sue letter, and she filed a complaint
in the district court.
FN1.
The defendants-appellees are referred to collectively
as the "United Methodist defendants."
Young's
complaint alleges race discrimination, sex discrimination,
and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et
seq. She claims that she was denied the promotion and
fired because of her race and sex, and because of her "opposition
to [the United Methodist defendant's] discriminatory practices."
*185 Specifically, she claims that the United Methodist
Church did not follow the procedure it had previously "always"
followed in such cases.
She
requested the district court to grant her several forms
of relief. First, she asked the court to order the United
Methodist defendant to reinstate her as a probationary minister
and award her back pay and other benefits. Second, she asked
the court to order the United Methodist defendant to re-
examine her application. Third, she sought compensatory
damages, punitive damages, fees, and costs.
The
United Methodist defendant responded with a motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It claimed that
the First Amendment forbids government interference with
"the internal ecclesiastical workings and discipline of
religious bodies." The district court found that it could
not decide the case without reaching the constitutional
issue, and that the First Amendment denied it subject matter
jurisdiction. It granted the motion to dismiss on that basis.
[1]
This appeal followed and calls for an examination of the
district court's constitutional ruling, that the First Amendment
denied it subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore we review
the court's grant of the motion to dismiss de novo. Sequoia
Books, Inc. v. Ingemunson, 901 F.2d 630, 633 (7th Cir.1990).
Young,
to prevail, must show that the First Amendment does not
preclude subject matter jurisdiction, as the district court
found. To do so, she argues that "there is no doubt" that
Title VII is applicable to religious organizations. In support,
Young cites to E.E.O.C. v. Mississippi College, 626
F.2d 477 (5th Cir.1980). She claims in her brief that this
case "applied Title VII to [a] religious organization[ ],
the First Amendment notwithstanding." This is a misstatement
of the case. The Fifth Circuit did not act "notwithstanding"
the Free Exercise Clause. Rather, it found that the Free
Exercise Clause was not implicated because "the College
is not a church and its faculty members are not ministers."
Id. at 485. The Fifth Circuit in Mississippi College
cited to its own prior case, McClure v. Salvation Army,
460 F.2d 553, 559-60 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 896, 93 S.Ct. 132, 34 L.Ed.2d 153 (1972), which had
"concluded that matters touching the relationship between
a church and its ministers, including the selection of a
minister, determination of salary, and assignment of duties
and location, are matters of church administration and government
and thus purely of ecclesiastical cognizance." Mississippi
College, 626 F.2d at 485.
Young
attempts to read Mississippi College as establishing
a general proposition that Title VII "applies to religious
organizations." But the case stands for no such thing. It
explicitly exempts "matters touching the relationship between
a church and its ministers." And that is precisely what
is at stake in this case.
In
support of her general claim that Title VII may be applied
to religious organizations, Young also cites to Rayburn
v. General Conf. of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d
1164, 1169 (4th Cir.1985), to demonstrate that the elimination
of discrimination is a compelling state interest "of the
highest order." This is unquestionably the case. But
Rayburn, after noting this truism, goes on to state
that:
[C]ourts
must distinguish incidental burdens on free exercise in
the service of a compelling state interest from burdens
where the "inroad on religious liberty" is too substantial
to be permissible.... This case is of the latter sort:
introduction of government standards to the selection of
spiritual leaders would significantly, and perniciously,
rearrange the relationship between church and state.
While an unfettered church may create minimal infidelity
to the objective of Title VII, it provides maximum protection
of the First Amendment right to the free exercise of religious
beliefs.
Id.
at 1169 (emphasis added). In other words, in a direct clash
of "highest order" interests, the interest in protecting
the free exercise of religion embodied in the First Amendment
to the Constitution prevails over the interest in ending
discrimination embodied in Title VII.
*186
In Rayburn the plaintiff alleged sex discrimination when
her application to serve as an "associate in pastoral care"
was rejected. The court noted that even though the plaintiff
was not seeking a position as an ordained minister, the
"ministerial exception" the Fifth Circuit enunciated in
McClure "does not depend upon ordination but upon the function
of the position." Rayburn at 1168.
Having
determined that the position was "important to the spiritual
and pastoral mission of the church," the Rayburn court held
that "the free exercise clause of the First Amendment protects
the act of a decision rather than a motivation behind it.
In these sensitive areas, the state may no more require
a minimum basis in doctrinal reasoning than it may supervise
doctrinal content." Id. at 1169 (emphasis added). See also
Scharon v. St. Lukes Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d
360, 363 (8th Cir.1991) (adopting "act of decision" language
when affirming summary judgment against plaintiff who alleged
age and sex discrimination when fired from position as chaplain).
Contrary
to Young's assertions Rayburn and Mississippi College actually
indicate that Title VII may not be applied in cases such
as the one before us because the First Amendment will not
allow it. Nevertheless, Young forges ahead claiming that
her complaint "only involves secular issues and will not
require any entanglements over religious issues." The district
court found to the contrary, relying in part on the case
of Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. 696, 717, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 2384, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976),
for the proposition that "the composition of a church's
hierarchy is also primarily an ecclesiastical matter left
for the church's sole resolution."
Young
attempts to distinguish Milivojevich by arguing that it
holds only that a First Amendment violation occurs when
a court "probes deeply" and makes "extensive inquiry into
religious law and policy" when reviewing decisions of the
"Highest Ecclesiastical Tribunal within a Church Hierarchical
Polity." If Young's position were correct, we would have
to determine how "deep" and how "extensive" an analysis
the district court was required to make before we could
decide if the free Exercise Clause is implicated.
The
Milivojevich case demonstrates that such an analysis is
unwarranted. In Milivojevich the Illinois Supreme Court
had overturned the defrocking and suspension of an Orthodox
bishop by his own church. The Illinois court based its decision
on certain language in the case of Gonzalez v. Archbishop,
280 U.S. 1, 50 S.Ct. 5, 74 L.Ed. 131 (1929), which stated
that the federal courts could review ecclesiastical decisions
where there was "fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness." The
court found that the church in that case had made an arbitrary
decision. Milivojevich alleged, exactly as Young does in
the instant case, that his church "had not followed its
own laws and procedures in arriving" at its decision. Milivojevich,
426 U.S. at 713, 96 S.Ct. at 2382.
In
reversing, the Supreme Court first noted that the "arbitrariness"
exception in Gonzalez was dicta and had no force. Therefore,
the binding precedent was the old rule set out in Watson
v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 13 Wall. 679, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1872),
which held that:
It
is of the essence of religious unions, and of their right
to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising
among themselves, that those decisions should be binding
in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only
to such appeals as the organism itself provides for.
Watson,
80 U.S. at 729, 13 Wall. at 728-29. Therefore, the Milivojevich
court concluded,
[n]o
"arbitrariness" exception--in the sense of an inquiry whether
the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal of
a hierarchical church complied with church laws and regulations--is
consistent with the constitutional mandate that civil courts
are bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories
[FN2] of a religious organization *187 of hierarchical polity
on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization,
or eccliastical rule, custom, or law.
FN2.
The language "highest judicatories" is derived from
Watson, 80 U.S. at 727, 13 Wall. at 727, which referred
to the "highest ... church judicatories to which the
matter has been carried." In other words, it refers
to the body internal to the church which made the final
disposition of the matter which subsequently gave rise
to the case at hand. It does not mean that a civil court
need only defer to the "highest" decision- making body
of the church and may ignore the others. Rather, it
means that the civil court must defer to the highest
body to which the matter had been carried prior to reaching
the civil court. As the Sixth Circuit pointed out in
Lewis v. Seventh Day Adventists Lake Region Conf., 978
F.2d 940, 943, to attempt to do otherwise would "require
a civil court to conduct a review of ecclesiastical
law to determine which tribunal is the highest. This
is exactly the type of inquiry which the First Amendment
forbids."
Milivojevich,
426 U.S. at 713, 96 S.Ct. at 2382.
[2]
The Court went on to hold that allowing review of "arbitrary"
decisions, which in this sense means decisions which do
not comply with a church's own rules or practices, is:
[E]xactly
the kind of inquiry that the First Amendment prohibits.
Recognition of such an exception would undermine the general
rule that religious controversies are not the proper subject
of civil court inquiry, and that a civil court must accept
the ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it finds
them.
Id.
In other words, religious bodies may make apparently arbitrary
decisions affecting the employment status of their clergy
members and be free from civil review having done so.
Young
also refers to the fact that Milivojevich "left open the
issue" of whether a church decision may be reviewed in the
case of "fraud or collusion." [FN3] Whatever unlikely significance
this "open issue" might have in some hypothetical case,
it is certainly not implicated in this case because Young
has alleged no fraud or collusion.
FN3.
This "open issue" is a remnant of the dicta Justice
Brandeis left in his opinion in Gonzalez, which indicated
that civil courts could review the decisions of "ecclesiastical
tribunals" in the case of arbitrariness, fraud or collusion.
280 U.S. at 16, 50 S.Ct. at 7. The court in Milivojevich
explicitly eliminated the arbitrariness exception. As
to the other exceptions, it did not say "whether or
not there is room for 'marginal civil court review'
under the narrow rubrics of 'fraud' or 'collusion' when
courts act in bad faith for secular purposes...." 426
U.S. at 713, 96 S.Ct. at 2382. Milivojevich merely leaves
open, but does not endorse, the possibility that limited
review would be available in cases of fraud or collusion.
After
summarizing Milivojevich, Young asserts that "it is evident
that [it] does not foreclose review" of her complaint. In
so arguing, Young selects language which would appear to
allow civil court review of decisions made by religious
bodies, so long as that review is not an "extensive inquiry"
into "religious law and polity." Id. at 709, 96 S.Ct. at
2380. From this language Young claims that a review of the
procedures which led to her firing would not have required
the district court to "probe deeply enough so as to decide
religious law governing church polity."
[3]
However, Young has omitted reference to the passages which
define what constitutes such a forbidden inquiry, which
occur a few pages later in the Milivojevich opinion. We
have cited those passages above. Milivojevich, read in its
entirety, holds that civil court review of ecclesiastical
decisions of church tribunals, particularly those pertaining
to the hiring or firing of clergy, are in themselves an
"extensive inquiry" into religious law and practice, and
hence forbidden by the First Amendment. Young's argument,
that Title VII may be applied to decisions by churches affecting
the employment of their clergy, is fruitless.
Although
this is the first time this precise issue has been presented
to us, its resolution is straightforward. As we have indicated,
Milivojevich holds that the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment forbids a review of a church's procedures
when it makes employment decisions affecting its clergy.
Id. 426 U.S. at 712-14, 96 S.Ct. at 2382. In fact, in Milivojevich
it was the precise issue of a change in internal procedure,
as in this case, which the Supreme Court refused to review.
The Supreme Court found this to be "exactly the kind of
inquiry that the First Amendment prohibits." Id. The inquiry
Young seeks is no different, and it too is prohibited.
It
was no help for Young to selectively cite and thus misleadingly
apply the relevant precedents, or to cite to cases yet ignore
their language which clearly states that what she asks the
federal courts to do is per se forbidden. To accept the
position advanced by *188 Young would require us to cast
a blind eye to the overwhelming weight of precedent going
back over a century in order to limit the scope of the protection
granted to religious bodies by the Free Exercise Clause.
There is nothing advocated by Young which raises any doubt
about the correctness of the district court's decision.
The dismissal is AFFIRMED.
Copr.
© West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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