|
894
F.2d 1354
58 USLW 2437,
51 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1372, 52 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,586
(Cite
as: 894 F.2d 1354, 282 U.S.App.D.C. 314)
United
States Court of Appeals,
District
of Columbia Circuit
Ralph
L. MINKER, Appellant,
v.
BALTIMORE
ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF UNITED METHODIST CHURCH and Bishop
Joseph A.
Yeakel,
Appellees.
No.
89-7009
Argued
Oct. 30, 1989
Decided
Jan. 19, 1990
Minister
filed complaint for age discrimination and breach of contract
against his church. The United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, Stanley S. Harris, J., 699 F.Supp.
954, dismissed complaint, and minister appealed. The Court
of Appeals, Mikva, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) maintenance
of age discrimination suit would violate free exercise clause;
(2) court lacked jurisdiction to hear minister's claim that
church constitution created enforceable agreement that church
would not discriminate against him on basis of age in making
appointments; and (3) oral contract to provide minister
with congregation more suited to his training and skills
in exchange for his continued work on temporary assignment
would create contractual relationship enforceable in civil
court if such proceedings would not create excessive entanglements
with religious beliefs.
Affirmed
in part and remanded in part.
Gesell,
District Judge, sitting by designation, filed opinion concurring
in result.
West
Headnotes
[1]
Civil Rights k169
78k169
[1]
Constitutional Law k84.5(10)
92k84.5(10)
Maintenance
of minister's age discrimination suit against his church
would violate free exercise clause. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, §§ 2 et seq., 4, 29 U.S.C.A. §§
621 et seq., 623; Md.Code 1957, Art. 49B, § 16; U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 1.
[2]
Constitutional Law k84.5(10)
92k84.5(10)
Interpretation
of appointment and antidiscrimination provisions of church
constitution was inherently an ecclesiastical matter, depriving
court of jurisdiction to hear minister's claim that church
constitution created enforceable agreement that church would
not discriminate against him on basis of age in making appointments.
[3]
Constitutional Law k84.5(10)
92k84.5(10)
[3]
Religious Societies k27(3)
332k27(3)
Oral
contract to provide minister with congregation more suited
to his training and skills in exchange for his continued
work on temporary assignment would create contractual relationship
enforceable in civil court if such proceedings would not
create excessive entanglements with religious beliefs. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 1.
[4]
Constitutional Law k84.5(7.1)
92k84.5(7.1)
(Formerly
92k84.5(7))
Church
is always free to burden its activities voluntarily through
contracts, and such contracts are fully enforceable in civil
court. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
*1355
**315
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia.
David
S. Eggert, with whom Randal M. Shaheen, Washington, D.C.
was on the brief, for appellant.
Thomas
R. Kline, with whom Thomas E. Starnes, Washington, D.C.
was on the brief, for appellees.
Before
MIKVA and BUCKLEY, Circuit Judges, and GESELL, [FN*] District
Judge.
FN*
Of the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 292(a).
Opinion
for the Court filed by Circuit Judge MIKVA.
Concurring
Opinion filed by District Judge GESELL.
MIKVA,
Circuit Judge:
Appellant,
a Methodist minister, challenges a lower court order dismissing
his complaint for age discrimination and breach of contract
against the United Methodist Church. Appellant charges that
he was denied a pastorship due to age discrimination, and
that this violated federal and state law as well as his
"contract" with the church. The district court determined
that the first amendment prohibits the government from regulating
internal church decisions about the promotion of pastors,
because churches have broad discretion in determining who
may speak for the church. 699 F.Supp. 954 (D.D.C.1988).
We affirm the district court's ruling to the extent that
it dismissed appellant's age discrimination claims. We remand
for further proceedings on the contractual claim that appellees
breached their promise to give appellant a more suitable
congregation at the earliest possible time.
BACKGROUND
Appellant,
Ralph Minker, is a 63-year-old Methodist minister employed
by the Baltimore Annual Conference of the United Methodist
Church. After serving for ten years as a vocational counselor,
Minker requested that he be returned to a pastoral appointment
in 1982. The following year, he assumed the pastorate of
Mount Rainier Methodist Church on a temporary, emergency
basis. Complaint ¶ 8-9.
Minker
alleges that the Mount Rainier assignment paid him less
than what a pastor of his qualifications and experience
would normally receive. Id. Minker complained to
the district superintendent who, he claims, assured him
that he would be "moved to a congregation more suited to
his training and skills, and more appropriate in level of
income, at the earliest appropriate time." Id. at
¶ 13. Minker made repeated requests for reassignment thereafter,
but as of June 1987 four years had elapsed without Minker
being offered a new assignment. Id. at ¶ 14.
In
July 1987, Minker filed suit in district court alleging
that he had been denied a rightful "promotion" solely on
the basis of his age. Minker asserted that appellee Bishop
Joseph Yeakel--who is responsible for all pastoral appointments--had
informed him that "he should not expect a new better level
appointment and that Methodist pastors in their fifties
cannot expect growth opportunities in new appointments."
Id. at ¶ 16. Minker further claimed that persons younger
than he were selected for many open appointments. Id.
The
complaint alleged that appellees violated the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, 623 (1983),
the Maryland Human Relations Law, Md.Ann.Code Art. 49B,
§ 16, and Minker's "contract" with his church. Complaint
at ¶ 25. The contract claim was based both on the district
superintendent's oral promises to find him a more suitable
congregation, and on passages from the Book of Discipline--"the
book of law of the United Methodist Church"--concerning
the assignment of pastorships. Section 529.1 of the Book
of Discipline states that "appointments *1356 **316 are
to be made without regard to race, ethnic origin, sex, color,
or age, except for the provisions of mandatory retirement."
Initially,
Minker sought monetary damages and an injunction against
age discrimination under the ADEA. He has since been appointed
pastor of the Corkran Memorial Church, and now desires only
damages and a general injunction against future discrimination.
Appellees
moved to dismiss, claiming that the first amendment barred
appellant's suit. The district court granted the appellees'
motion. 699 F.Supp. 954. The court held that applying state
and federal antidiscrimination legislation or common law
principles of contract to Minker's claims would violate
the free exercise clause of the first amendment because
it would interfere with church decisions concerning "whose
voice speaks for the church." Id. at 955. The district
court concluded that appellant's suit failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.
Minker
appeals on two grounds. First, he contends that the first
amendment does not apply to his statutory claims. He argues
that the Church has no religious policy permitting age discrimination,
and no religious belief can be implicated by the facts alleged.
Second, he argues that the first amendment cannot bar enforcement
of his private employment contract because the issue of
breach does not implicate first amendment principles. Alternatively,
he contends that even if the facts might implicate religious
beliefs, the district court's decision to dismiss was premature
since he should be afforded an opportunity to show that
his contract claim does not create an excessive entanglement
with church religious policy.
I
AGE
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
[1]
Minker argues that application of the ADEA or the Maryland
age discrimination provision would not violate either the
free exercise clause or the establishment clause of the
first amendment. Because we find that maintenance of appellant's
suit would violate the free exercise clause, we need not
consider whether it would also violate the establishment
clause.
The
first amendment provides that Congress may not interfere
with the free exercise of religion. The free exercise clause
bars enforcement of a statute whose application would directly
affect religious beliefs. Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672, 689, 91 S.Ct. 2091, 2101, 29 L.Ed.2d 790 (1970);
see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216, 92 S.Ct.
1526, 1533, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1971) (refusing effect to a mandatory
school attendance law as applied to Amish children). Appellant
argues that since the Church has already declared its opposition
to age discrimination in employment decisions in the Book
of Discipline, it cannot now claim that it has a religious
belief supporting age discrimination. If no religious beliefs
are involved, he reasons, no first amendment rights are
implicated.
Appellant
seeks to apply a "plain meaning" rule to interpreting the
antidiscrimination provisions of the Book of Discipline
("Discipline"). We doubt that such a canon of construction
is suitable to canon law. There is substantial ambiguity
about the Church's position on age discrimination at the
time this case arose. The 1984-88 version of the Book of
Discipline provided that appointments must take into account
the "unique needs of a charge ... and also the gifts and
graces of a particular pastor." Discipline at ¶ 531. These
gifts and graces include the pastor's "experience and continuing
education, professional experience, records of performance,
[and] age." Id. at ¶ 531.2 (emphasis added).
This suggests that, the nondiscrimination provision notwithstanding,
the Methodist Church does have an asserted ecclesiastical
interest in considering age in appointing pastors.
We
need not consider the precise contours of church policy,
however, to reject Minker's claim that lay courts have jurisdiction
to hear his age discrimination claims. Rather, as the district
court held, determination of "whose voice speaks for the
church" is per se a religious matter. *1357 **317
699 F.Supp. at 955. We cannot imagine an area of inquiry
less suited to a temporal court for decision; evaluation
of the "gifts and graces" of a minister must be left to
ecclesiastical institutions. This is the view of every court
that has been confronted by this genre of dispute. See,
e.g., Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists,
772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1020, 106 S.Ct. 3333, 92 L.Ed.2d 739 (1986).
In
McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896, 93 S.Ct. 132, 34 L.Ed.2d
153 (1972), the Fifth Circuit ruled that the free exercise
clause precluded the application of Title VII to a minister's
claim that her church had discriminated against her on the
basis of her gender. The court reasoned that since the minister
is the "lifeblood" of the church, the assignment of a minister
is inherently of prime ecclesiastical concern. It observed
that applying Title VII to assignment decisions would involve
the court in substantive ecclesiastical matters and permit
courts to interfere with church administration. Merely maintaining
such a suit would produce "an investigation and review of
... matters of church administration and government ...
[which] could only produce by its coercive effect the very
opposite of that ... contemplated by the First Amendment."
460 F.2d at 558- 60.
The
plaintiff's claim in Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corporation,
494 F.2d 490 (5th Cir.1974), was almost identical to that
raised here. The Fifth Circuit dismissed a Methodist pastor's
suit, arising from his claim that he had been expelled from
his parish because of his wife's race. The plaintiff argued
that consideration of his suit did not involve religious
matters, because he was dismissed for reasons unrelated
to religious belief or policy. He too raised the antidiscrimination
provision of the Book of Discipline, and the court expressly
rejected this argument. It noted that there is no exception
to the bar against interfering with matters of church administration.
494 F.2d at 493; see also Rayburn v. General Conference
of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir.1985),
cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 3333, 92 L.Ed.2d
739 (1986); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344
U.S. 94, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952).
As
this court observed in King's Garden Inc. v. FCC,
498 F.2d 51, 56 (D.C.Cir.1974), "[t]he Free Exercise Clause
precludes governmental interference with ecclesiastical
hierarchies, church administration, and appointment of clergy."
Not only may a church adopt its own idiosyncratic reasons
for appointing pastors, but also it "has a legitimate claim
to autonomy in the elaboration and pursuit of that goal."
Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1171. We need not find that the
factors relied upon by the Church were independently ecclesiastical
in nature, only that they were related to a pastoral appointment
determination. See Granfield v. Catholic University of
America, 530 F.2d 1035, 1047 (D.C.Cir.1976) (holding
that the salary scale of priests in a church-related institution
is an internal religious question).
Minker
argues that taken to its logical conclusion our view would
create a first amendment prohibition against even the most
egregious human rights violations. He suggests, for example,
that under our formulation courts would be prevented from
enforcing homicide statutes against churches that selected
their pastors by making them play russian roulette.
This
hypothetical obviously distorts existing first amendment
doctrine. The Supreme Court has consistently recognized
that the religion clauses are subject to a balancing of
interests test. E.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S.
618, 628 n. 8, 98 S.Ct. 1322, 1328 n. 8, 55 L.Ed.2d 593
(1978). The Court has also concluded that certain civil
rights protected in secular settings are not sufficiently
compelling to overcome certain religious interests. Gonzalez
v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16, 50 S.Ct.
5, 7, 74 L.Ed. 131 (1929) ("[Decisions of church authorities
concerning] the essential qualifications of [clergy] and
who possess them ... although affecting civil rights, are
accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive....").
*1358
**318
The cases cited by appellant in which courts have applied
employment statutes to employees of church affiliated institutions
are inapposite. In EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n.,
482 F.Supp. 1291 (N.D.Cal.1979), a secretary in a church-owned
publishing house was permitted to maintain a sex discrimination
action against her employer under Title VII. However, in
that case, as in every other case cited by appellant, the
court based its finding on the fact that these employees
were not "ministers." The same "voice of the church" concerns
simply were not present. See, e.g., EEOC v. Mississippi
College, 626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir.1980) (distinguishing
McClure because "faculty members are not intermediaries
between a church and its congregation").
Finally,
appellant urges that the "minister/nonminister" distinction
is unworkable. Appellant notes that under this distinction
church secretaries and teachers are protected (EEOC v.
Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir.1980),
cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912, 101 S.Ct. 3143, 69 L.Ed.2d
994 (1981); EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n.,
676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir.1982)) but seminarians or theology
professors at a sectarian university are not (EEOC v.
Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d
277 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905, 102
S.Ct. 1749, 72 L.Ed.2d 161 (1982); Maguire v. Marquette
University, 627 F.Supp. 1499 (E.D.Wisc.1986) aff'd
on other grounds, 814 F.2d 1213 (7th Cir.1987)). These
cases, he argues, illustrate that the ministerial functions
test in fact encourages intrusive inquiries into church
policy by raising questions about the role of individual
employees. We doubt the merits of this argument, but in
any event it is not appropriate to this case. Appellant
is clearly a minister and so we find this case does not
present an appropriate occasion to contemplate the merits
of the "ministerial functions" test.
We
affirm the district court's finding that application of
ADEA or the Maryland statute to this case would violate
the free exercise clause of the first amendment.
II
CONTRACT
CLAIMS
The
two contract claims of appellant raise different policy
concerns. Appellant first contends that the Book of Discipline
creates an enforceable agreement that the Church will not
discriminate against him on the basis of age in making appointments.
Second, he urges that the superintendent's promise to provide
him with a more suitable pastorship at the earliest possible
time constitutes an enforceable employment contract.
A.
The Book of Discipline
Section
529.1 of the Book of Discipline states that "appointments
are to be made without regard to race, ethnic origin, sex,
color, or age, except for the provisions of mandatory retirement."
Appellant urges that this provision forms a contract between
himself and the Church which he may enforce in a secular
court. We have already pointed to the perils of appellant's
efforts to give this provision only its literal contours.
Even assuming that this provision does have some contractual
aspects, this court could not interpret or enforce such
a provision without running afoul of the first amendment.
As
the Supreme Court noted in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S.
595, 602, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 3024, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979), "the
[First] Amendment requires that civil courts defer to the
resolution of issues of religious doctrine or policy by
the highest court of a hierarchical church organization."
For this court to interpret the antidiscrimination provision
of the Book of Discipline would require us to interpret
or enforce matters of essential religious dogma.
It
is true that not all provisions of a religious constitution
are immune from civil court interpretation. In Jones
v. Wolf, the Court adopted the neutral principles test
which permits a court to interpret provisions of religious
documents involving property rights and other nondoctrinal
matters as long as the analysis can be done in purely secular
terms. In doing so, the Court cited with approval a state
court's *1359 **319 application of the Book of Discipline
to a property dispute between a church and its congregation.
443 U.S. at 600-01, 99 S.Ct. at 3023-24 (citing Carnes
v. Smith, 236 Ga. 30, 222 S.E.2d 322, cert. denied,
429 U.S. 868, 97 S.Ct. 180, 50 L.Ed.2d 148 (1976)).
The
Jones court itself cautioned that not all provisions
of a church constitution are susceptible to neutral interpretation.
It observed that even among property provisions "there may
be cases where the ... constitution of a general church
incorporates religious concepts.... If in such a case the
interpretation of the instruments of ownership would require
the civil courts to resolve a religious controversy, then
the court must defer to the resolution of the doctrinal
issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body." Id.
at 604, 99 S.Ct. at 3026; see also Dowd v. Society of
St. Columbans, 861 F.2d 761, 764 (1st Cir.1988);
Hutchison v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392, 393 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 885, 107 S.Ct. 277, 93 L.Ed.2d
253 (1986) (dismissing a Methodist minister's claim that
the church had violated his "contract" by improperly applying
provisions of the Book of Discipline in discharging him
because these involved "subjective judgments made by religious
officials and bodies").
[2]
The age discrimination passages of the Book of Discipline
are just such a provision. In determining whether the Church
has discriminated on the basis of age, a court would be
required to consider the religious purpose of the antidiscrimination
provision and to define its limits for the Church. The scope
of the Church's purported duty to not discriminate in its
ministerial appointments will inevitably require interpretation
of provisions in the Discipline that are highly subjective,
spiritual, and ecclesiastical in nature. These duties are
not necessarily identical to the government's duty under
Title VII, but may be informed by such religious considerations
as an evaluation of the "gifts and graces" of a minister.
Unlike the property provisions at issue in Jones,
Minker's suit necessarily involves interpretation of the
minister's occupational qualifications which requires an
"understanding of the genuine desire to embody and carry
forth more effectively Christ's ministry." Discipline at
¶ 445.
We
hold that the interpretation of the appointment and antidiscrimination
provisions of the Book of Discipline is inherently an ecclesiastical
matter; it follows that this court lacks jurisdiction to
hear Minker's contract claim.
B.
Oral Contract
[3]
Lastly, appellant argues that the first amendment cannot
bar his action for breach of an oral employment contract.
We find this contention compelling. The case arises on dismissal
for failure to state a claim; therefore we must assume as
true all allegations in Pastor Minker's complaint. Jenkins
v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 1848,
23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969). We assume that the district superintendent
did in fact promise to provide appellant with a congregation
more suited to his training and skills in exchange for his
continued work at the Mount Ranier Church. Such facts clearly
would create a contractual relationship.
[4]
A church is always free to burden its activities voluntarily
through contracts, and such contracts are fully enforceable
in civil court. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
679, 714, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1871). In Jones v. Wolf, supra,
the Supreme Court specified that courts may always resolve
contracts governing "the manner in which churches own property,
hire employees, or purchase goods." Id. at 606, 99
S.Ct. at 3027. Even cases that rejected ministers' discrimination
claims have noted that churches nonetheless "may be held
liable upon their valid contracts." Rayburn, supra,
772 F.2d at 1171.
The
Church seeks to distinguish these precedents on the ground
that even proving the existence of a contract in this case
would require the sort of inquiry into subjective, spiritual,
and ecclesiastical matters that the first amendment prohibits.
The Church asserts that Jones is inapposite because
it involved concrete matters that did not require a far-reaching
inquiry. It is true, as the Supreme Court noted in another
*1360 **320 context, courts may not consider provisions
whose enforcement would require "a searching and therefore
impermissible inquiry" into church doctrine. Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
723, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 2387, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976).
The
Church asserts that this case would produce the types of
court inquiries into administrative matters prohibited in
Rayburn. The Rayburn court held that entanglements
might result from a protracted legal procedure which might
involve subpoenas, discovery, and other tools designed to
probe the mind of the church. 772 F.2d at 1170-71. The Church
asserts that simply permitting a court to hear Minker's
contract claims might distort church appointment decisions--causing
churches to make only those choices that avoid the appearance
of legal impropriety.
We
acknowledge that the contract alleged by Minker threatens
to touch the core of the rights protected by the free exercise
clause. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553,
558-59 (5th Cir.1972) ("The relationship between an organized
church and its ministers is its lifeblood. The minister
is the chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill
its purpose."). We also agree that any inquiry into the
Church's reasons for asserting that Minker was not suited
for a particular pastorship would constitute an excessive
entanglement in its affairs. See Natal v. Christian and
Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575 (1st Cir.1989) (inquiry
into reasons for minister's discharge would plunge court
"into a maelstrom of Church policy, administration, and
governance"); Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1171.
Nevertheless,
the first amendment does not immunize the church from all
temporal claims made against it. As we noted in Costello
Publishing Co. v. Rotelle, 670 F.2d 1035 (D.C.Cir.1981),
appellant need show only that some form of inquiry
is permissible and some form of remedy is available
to survive a motion to dismiss. In Costello, this
court reversed a lower court grant of summary judgment for
the Roman Catholic Church in an antitrust case concerning
the church's alleged efforts to discourage retailers from
purchasing a specific religious book. The court noted that
summary judgment was inappropriate because the trial court
should at least consider the circumstances of the alleged
activity to determine whether a religious concern existed
and whether a nonintrusive remedy could be fashioned.
Id. at 1050 n. 31.
We
find that appellant should be allowed to demonstrate that
he can prove his case without resorting to impermissible
avenues of discovery or remedies. As a theoretical matter,
the issue of breach of contract can be adduced by a fairly
direct inquiry into whether appellant's superintendent promised
him a more suitable congregation, whether appellant gave
consideration in exchange for that promise, and whether
such congregations became available but were not offered
to Pastor Minker. Similarly, Minker's injury can be remedied
without court oversight. Money damages alone would suffice
since Minker already has a new pastorship. Maintaining a
suit, by itself, will not necessarily create an excessive
entanglement. Furthermore, as the remedy would be limited
to the award of money damages, we see no potential for distortion
of church appointment decisions from requiring that the
Church not make empty, misleading promises to its clergy.
It
could turn out that in attempting to prove his case, appellant
will be forced to inquire into matters of ecclesiastical
policy even as to his contract claim. Of course, in that
situation, a court may grant summary judgment on the ground
that appellant has not proved his case and pursuing the
matter further would create an excessive entanglement with
religion. On the other hand, it may turn out that the potentially
mischievous aspects of Minker's claim are not contested
by the Church or are subject to entirely neutral methods
of proof. The speculative nature of our discussion here
demonstrates why it is premature to foreclose appellant's
contract claim. Once evidence is offered, the district court
will be in a position to control the case so as to protect
against any impermissible entanglements. Thus, while the
first amendment forecloses any inquiry into the Church's
*1361 **321 assessment of Minker's suitability for a pastorship,
even for the purpose of showing it to be pretextual, it
does not prevent the district court from determining whether
the contract alleged by Minker in fact exists. Catholic
High School Ass'n v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161, 1168 (2d
Cir.1985) (first amendment prohibition of state board's
ability to inquire into nature of religious motives does
not preclude it from asserting jurisdiction). For this reason,
we find that appellant's oral contract claim cannot be totally
foreclosed on a motion to dismiss.
III
FEDERAL
JURISDICTION
Our
holding raises a new jurisdictional issue on remand. Initially,
federal jurisdiction over appellant's state law claims was
proper under the district court's pendent federal question
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or jurisdiction under federal
civil rights statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Having properly
dismissed appellant's federal age discrimination claims
before trial, the district court may no longer assert pendent
jurisdiction over appellant's state contract claims.
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86
S.Ct. 1130, 1139, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966); Sanchez-Espinoza
v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 210 (D.C.Cir.1985).
If
jurisdiction exists at all, it must lie on the basis of
diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Appellant alleges
that he was "residing in Virginia" at the time he filed
his complaint and that appellee is incorporated in the State
of Maryland. We note that the complaint does not specifically
allege that Minker is a "citizen" of Virginia, and to that
extent, the claim of diversity jurisdiction is technically
defective. Whitelock v. Leatherman, 460 F.2d 507,
514 n. 14 (10th Cir.1972). On remand, the district court
must determine for itself whether diversity of citizenship
exists before addressing the substantive contract claims
presented. National Farmers Union Property & Gas
Co. v. Fisher, 284 F.2d 421, 423 (8th Cir.1960). If
the district court finds federal jurisdiction lacking, it
may either dismiss or exercise its authority under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1631 to transfer this case to a state court in which suit
might more properly have been brought.
CONCLUSION
The
decision to appoint a minister is uniquely within a church's
ecclesiastical discretion. We find the district court properly
concluded that it may not interpret a church's spiritual
policies without interfering with the free exercise of religion.
But the first amendment does not afford defenses against
promises made and contracts formed. A church, like any other
employer, is bound to perform its promissory obligations
in accord with contract law. Pastor Minker is entitled to
rely upon his employer's representations and to enforce
them in a secular court. It is possible that the first amendment's
prohibition against proceedings that would create excessive
entanglements with religious beliefs will make appellant's
task at trial more difficult. But these difficulties do
not eliminate appellant's right to enforce his employment
contract.
Courts
must always be wary of efforts to invoke their temporal
powers in place of churchly powers. Such efforts are inconsistent
with the free exercise of religion that the first amendment
asserts to be inviolate. But the line between such proscribed
lawsuits and legitimate claims for commercial obligations
of a church is a thin one. It is that thin line which we
direct the district court to find and hew to in this case.
Appellant is entitled to prove up his claim of breach of
an oral contract to the extent that he can divine a course
clear of the Church's ecclesiastical domain. For such limited
purposes, the case is Remanded.
GESELL,
District Judge, concurring in the result.
I
concur in the result and respectfully note my concerns.
The opinion deals comprehensively with a difficult case
and an even more challenging problem. It seeks without benefit
of a factual record to balance our deep-seated respect for
First Amendment religious protection against the virus of
discrimination based on age, *1362 **322 sex, race and national
origin which appears in every aspect of our society. General
propositions are stated in a manner that may appear to lay
down firm guidance for subsequent religious discrimination
cases. In my opinion this is unnecessary. In the future
there may well be some who seek to avoid scrutiny of a primary
discriminatory objective in the selection or creation of
religious officials by exploiting a marginal First Amendment
religious claim. I believe the wiser course would be to
allow the law to evolve in this difficult area case-by-case,
aided, wherever necessary, by meaningful records developed
on factual motions or trial. It is too early to anticipate
whether some of the absolutes announced in the opinion will
withstand the test of time or be considered appropriate
under all circumstances.
Copr.
© West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
Reprinted from Westlaw with permission of Thomson/West. If you wish to check the currency of this case, you may do so using KeyCite on Westlaw by visiting http://www.westlaw.com/.
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