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UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT.
Lee
Otis GELLINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CHRISTIAN
METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
No.
99-10603.
Feb.
17, 2000.
Appeal
from the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Alabama.
(No.
997-02719-CV-P-W), Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Judge.
Before
BLACK, Circuit Judge, and GODBOLD and FAY, Senior Circuit
Judges.
BLACK,
Circuit Judge:
Appellant
Lee Otis Gellington brought this action against his former
employer, Appellee Christian Methodist Episcopal Church,
Inc., alleging he was retaliated against and constructively
discharged in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Appellee after concluding that the ministerial exception
barred Appellant from bringing suit under Title VII against
Appellee. Appellant appeals, presenting the narrow question
of whether the ministerial exception survives the Supreme
Court's decision in Employment Division, Dep't of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct.
1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). We conclude the ministerial
exception to Title VII survives the Supreme Court's holding
in Smith, and accordingly affirm the order of the
district court.
I.
BACKGROUND
Appellant
is an ordained minister of the Christian Methodist Episcopal
(CME) Church. CME Church is divided into ten Episcopal districts.
Beginning in 1995, Appellant served as a minister in a church
located in Mobile, Alabama, which is part of the Fifth Episcopal
district. One of Appellant's co-workers at the Mobile church
was Veronica Little, who also was employed as a minister.
On more than one occasion, Little confided in Appellant
that her immediate supervisor had made sexual advances toward
her, and she asked Appellant for guidance on how to handle
this situation. Appellant advised and aided Little in preparing
an official complaint to the church elders. Shortly after
he aided Little in her complaint, Appellant was reassigned
to a church over 800 miles away from his home at a substantial
reduction in salary. Appellant states that he could not
comply with this reassignment and consequently was forced
to resign.
Appellant
brought this action, alleging Appellee retaliated against
him and constructively discharged him for aiding Little
in her sexual harassment complaint. Appellee then filed
a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion because it concluded that the ministerial exception
to Title VII, created in McClure v. Salvation Army,
460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.1972), barred Appellant from bringing
his claim against Appellee. Appellant appeals this order.
II.
ANALYSIS
We
review de novo a grant of summary judgment by the
district court, applying the same standards. See Harris
v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 518 (11th
Cir.1996). We view the evidence, and all factual inferences
that can reasonably be drawn from the evidence, in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Stewart v.
Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278,
1285 (11th Cir.1997).
There
is no question that the district court's grant of summary
judgment would have been correct prior to 1990. McClure
v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.1972), established
that Title VII is not applicable to the employment relationship
between a church and its ministers. See id. at 560.
In McClure, a minister of the Salvation Army sued
the church under Title VII, alleging she was discriminated
against on the basis of sex and discharged because of her
complaints regarding this alleged discrimination. See
id. at 555. After noting that the First Amendment has
built a "wall of separation" between church and state, and
that there is a long history of allowing churches to be
free from state interference in matters of church governance,
the Fifth Circuit held that it would not apply Title VII
to the minister-church employment relationship. See id.
at 558-560. The court reasoned that applying Title VII to
this relationship "would result in an encroachment by the
State into an area of religious freedom which it is forbidden
to enter by the principles of the free exercise clause of
the First Amendment." Id. at 560. The court concluded
that matters such as "the determination of a minister's
salary, his place of assignment, and the duty he is to perform
in furtherance of the religious mission of the church" were
all functions with which the state could not interfere.
Id. at 559.
Since
McClure, many other Circuits also have adopted the
ministerial exception to Title VII. See, e.g., Young
v. Northern Illinois Conf. of United Methodist Church,
21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir.1994) (holding that Free Exercise Clause
forbids review of church's employment decisions involving
clergy); Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conf. of United Methodist
Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C.Cir.1990) (concluding that
allowing minister to sue church under ADEA would violate
Free Exercise Clause); Natal v. Christian and Missionary
Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575 (1st Cir.1989) (following McClure
in concluding that clergyman is barred by First Amendment
from suing not-for-profit religious organization for wrongful
termination); Rayburn v. General Conf. of Seventh-Day
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir.1985) (holding that
plaintiff's Title VII challenge to denial of pastoral appointment
was barred by religion clauses of First Amendment).
Appellant
argues that although McClure was the law of this
Circuit prior to 1990, the ministerial exception to Title
VII created in McClure cannot exist subsequent to
the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division,
Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). In Smith,
Alfred Smith and Galen Black challenged a determination
that their religious use of peyote, which resulted in their
dismissal from employment, was "misconduct" disqualifying
them from receiving Oregon unemployment compensation benefits.
See id. at 874, 110 S.Ct. at 1597-98. The claimants
argued that Oregon violated the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment when it denied them unemployment benefits
solely because of their sacramental use of peyote, a controlled
substance under Oregon law. See id. The Court held
the Free Exercise Clause did not bar Oregon from prohibiting
the religious use of peyote, explaining that "the right
of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation
to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability
on the ground that the law proscribes ... conduct that his
religion prescribes." Id. at 879, 110 S.Ct. at 1600
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court
also rejected the argument that Oregon at least be forced
to satisfy the compelling interest test before applying
a neutral law of general applicability to religion-based
conduct. See id. at 885, 110 S.Ct. at 1603.
Appellant
argues that because Smith held that religious beliefs
do not excuse compliance with a generally applicable law,
Appellee cannot evade the legal obligations imposed by Title
VII simply because it is a religious organization. Appellant
contends that because Title VII is a neutral law of general
applicability, the First Amendment does not bar the application
of Title VII to Appellee even if its application would burden
the free exercise of religion.
Two
Circuits have concluded the ministerial exception survives
Smith. The D.C. Circuit first considered this question
in EEOC v. Catholic University of America, 83 F.3d
455 (D.C.Cir.1996). A Catholic nun brought a Title VII sex
discrimination suit against the University after she was
denied tenure. See id. at 459. In addressing the
plaintiff's claim, the court noted that the "Supreme Court
has recognized that government action may burden the free
exercise of religion" in two ways: "by interfering with
a believer's ability to observe the commands or practices
of his faith, and by encroaching on the ability of a church
to manage its internal affairs." Id. at 460 (citations
omitted). The court then noted that the ministerial exception
was developed, in part, to protect churches from the second
type of government interference. See id. at 462.
The court reasoned, however, that Smith focused exclusively
on the first prong of the free exercise clause, the individual's
ability to observe the practices of his or her religion.
See id. at 462. Concluding that Smith therefore
was not applicable to the ministerial exception, the court
stated "the burden on free exercise that is addressed by
the ministerial exception is of a fundamentally different
character from that at issue in Smith and in the
cases cited by the Court in support of its holding.... [T]he
ministerial exception does not present the dangers warned
of in Smith." Id.
The
D.C. Circuit also concluded the Supreme Court's rejection
in Smith of the compelling interest test did not
affect the continuing existence of the ministerial exception.
See id. at 462-63. The court noted that although
some of the cases applying the ministerial exception cited
the compelling interest test, the exception was not based
on this test, but rather on a "long line of Supreme Court
cases that affirm the fundamental right of churches to 'decide
for themselves, free from state interference, matters of
church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.'
" Id. at 462 (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America,
344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S.Ct. 143, 154, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952)).
Consequently, the D.C. Circuit held that the rejection of
the compelling interest test did not alter this "century-old
affirmation of a church's sovereignty over its own affairs."
Id. at 463.
The
Fifth Circuit has also held that the ministerial exception
to Title VII survives Smith. In Combs v. Central
Texas Annual Conf. of United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d
343 (5th Cir.1999), the court considered a Title VII sex
discrimination claim brought by a female clergy member against
her church. See id. at 345. In concluding that the
suit was barred by the ministerial exception, the court
agreed with both the reasoning and the conclusion of the
D.C. Circuit, noting
Smith'
s language is clearly directed at the first strand of
free exercise law, where an individual contends that,
because of his religious beliefs, he should not be required
to conform with generally applicable laws. The concerns
raised in Smith are quite different from the
concerns raised by Reverend Comb's case, which pertains
to interference in internal church management.
Id.
at 349. The court reasoned that the constitutional protection
of religious freedom afforded to churches in employment
actions involving clergy exists even when such actions are
not based on issues of church doctrine or ecclesiastical
law. See id. at 350. The court also concluded that
this "fundamental right of churches to be free from government
interference in their internal management and administration"
had not been affected by the Smith Court's refusal
to apply the compelling interest test. Id.
We
agree with the Fifth and D.C. Circuits and hold that the
ministerial exception created in McClure has not
been overruled by the Supreme Court's decision in Smith.
The Smith decision focused on the first type of government
infringement on the right of free exercise of religion–infringement
on an individual's ability to observe the practices of his
or her religion. The second type of government infringement–interference
with a church's ability to select and manage its own clergy–was
not at issue in Smith. The Court's concern in Smith
was that if an individual's legal obligations were contingent
upon religious beliefs, those beliefs would allow each individual
" 'to become a law unto himself.' " Smith, 494 U.S.
at 885, 110 S.Ct. at 1603 (quoting Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145, 167, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1879)).
The ministerial exception does not subvert this concern;
it was not developed to provide protection to individuals
who wish to observe a religious practice that contravenes
a generally applicable law. Rather, the exception only continues
a long-standing tradition that churches are to be free from
government interference in matters of church governance
and administration. See, e.g., Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 107, 73 S.Ct. 143, 150, 97 L.Ed.
120 (1952) ("Legislation that regulates church administration,
the operation of the churches, [or] the appointment clergy
... prohibits the free exercise of religion"). Also, because
the ministerial exception is based on this tradition and
not on strict scrutiny, the Court's rejection in Smith
of the compelling interest test does not affect the continuing
vitality of the ministerial exception.
We
noted in McClure "[t]he relationship between an organized
church and its ministers is its lifeblood. The minister
is the chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill
its purpose." 460 F.2d at 558-559. An attempt by the government
to regulate the relationship between a church and its clergy
would infringe upon the church's right to be the sole governing
body of its ecclesiastical rules and religious doctrine.
Furthermore,
applying Title VII to the employment relationship between
a church and its clergy would involve "excessive government
entanglement with religion" as prohibited by the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. See Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 613, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2111, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971).
Investigation by a government entity into a church's employment
of its clergy would almost always entail excessive government
entanglement into the internal management of the church.
A church's view on whether an individual is suited for a
particular clergy position cannot be replaced by the courts'
without entangling the government "in questions of religious
doctrine, polity, and practice." Jones v. Wolf, 443
U.S. 595, 603, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 3025, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979).
The Establishment Clause thus also mandates that churches
retain exclusive control over strictly ecclesiastical matters.
III.
CONCLUSION
For
the foregoing reasons, we find that the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment prohibit a
church from being sued under Title VII by its clergy. The
district court therefore properly granted Appellee's motion
for summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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