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PUBLISHED
UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
JAMES
M. BELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PRESBYTERIAN
CHURCH (U.S.A.);
BOARD
OF CHURCH AND SOCIETY OF THE
UNITED
METHODIST CHURCH; WOMEN'S
DIVISION
OF THE GENERAL BOARD OF
GLOBAL
MINISTRIES OF THE UNITED
METHODIST
CHURCH; AMERICAN BAPTIST
CHURCHES
IN THE U.S.A., No.
96-1297
Defendants-Appellees,
and
ELENORA
GIDDINGS IVORY; JANE HULL HARVEY;
ANNA
RHEE; JAY LINTNER; ROBERT TILLER;
LIONEL
DERENONCOURT; OTIS TURNER;
VERNON
BROYLES,
Defendants.
Appeal
from the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Leonie
M. Brinkema, District Judge.
(CA-95-1507-A)
Argued:
April 10, 1997
Decided:
October 1, 1997
Before
HALL and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and DUFFY, United States
District Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting
by designation.
Affirmed
by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion,
in which Judge Hall and Judge Duffy joined.
_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED:
James Wright Crabtree, SMATHERS & THOMPSON, Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Alissa Aaronson Horvitz,
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for
Appellees. ON BRIEF: Katharine B. Houlihan, MORGAN,
LEWIS & BOCKIUS, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
OPINION
NIEMEYER,
Circuit Judge:
The
Reverend James M. Bell, an ordained minister, served as
executive director of Interfaith Impact, a multi-denominational
outreach program. In June 1995, his employment was terminated
as part of Interfaith Impact's "complete reduction in force."
Interfaith Impact's board of directors advised Bell that
the termination was "based solely upon the financial condition"
of the program and was "absolutely no reflection on the
quality of your work." Bell sued Interfaith Impact's four
principal constituent religious organizations, as well as
others, for breach of contract and various torts arising
from the termination. The district court dismissed the complaint
against the constituent religious organizations because
of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that,
by reason of the First Amendment, a civil court has no jurisdiction
over ecclesiastical decisions by churches "as to how they
are going to expend their funds." For the reasons that follow,
we affirm the judgment of the district court.
I
More
than twenty religious groups, including as principal contributors
four national religious organizations, created and funded
Inter-faith Impact, a nonprofit corporation in Washington,
D.C., "to advance the jointly shared religious purposes
of its members, namely, to carry out their theological imperative
to increase the possibilities for peace, economic and social
justice." Interfaith Impact's charter states as its mission:
(1) promoting
a public policy that reflects prophetic Jewish- Christian
values, (2) advocating to the United States government
the enactment of public policies that are just,
promote peace and protect the environment (reflecting
Jewish- Christian values), (3) developing
and nurturing people of faith...to be effective advocates
for public policies that are just, promote peace
and protect the environment, (4) maximizing the
voice, visibility, and ability of member agencies and
denominations or faith groups to advocate for [such
policies], (5) educating...the general public on
the public policy issues of major concern to the
inter-religious community.
In
the fall of 1991, Interfaith Impact "called" Bell, an ordained
minister, to serve as its executive director. In the engagement
letter, Interfaith Impact recognized that Bell's service
would be an extension of his ministry with the United Church
of Christ, in which he was an ordained minister. It stated:
We
are happy that the four entities required by the United
Church of Christ to recognize your ordained ministry
in this position will do so. Those entities are you
and your sense of call; the recognition of this
being a place of ministry by your local church; the
Potomac Association of the United Church of Christ;
and Interfaith Impact for Justice and Peace.
The
letter confirmed a financial arrangement that designated
$25,000 of Bell's salary as "housing allowance" to enable
him to claim a parsonage exemption from income taxes and
a contribution that Inter-faith Impact would make to the
United Church of Christ's pension program so that Bell would
continue to receive pension and health benefits from that
church. The letter concluded,"We hope this will be a rewarding
ministry for you."
Because
of diminished support from constituent faith groups in the
spring of 1995, the full explanation fo r which does not
appear in the record, Interfaith Impact began to experience
serious financial difficulties. In May 1995, the Presbyterian
Church, one of Interfaith Impact's main financial contributors,
decided that because of the financial crisis it would not
allocate further funds for Interfaith Impact for the year
1996. It also conditioned fulfillment of its 1995 commitment
on a complete reduction of force and vacation of the premises
rented by Interfaith Impact. The Presbyterian Church explained,
"The current situation is not to be seen as the fault of the
current staff who are in many ways victims of the circumstances
the faith groups find themselves in due to diminished resources."
In
response to the Presbyterian Church's withdrawal of support,
the board of directors of Interfaith Impact promptly effected
a complete reduction of force, intending to continue the
program's ministry with a volunteer staff. In its letter
of termination to Bell, dated June 23, 1995, the board stated:
Your
termination is based solely upon the financial condition
of Interfaith IMPACT which has [led] the Board of Directors
to enact a complete "reduction in force." In this
termination, there is absolutely no reflection on the
quality of your work.
The
letter concluded, "I would again express to you my admiration
and appreciation of your work, my regret for the situation
that makes this reduction necessary, and my gratitude for
the helpfulness which you are continuing to give to Interfaith
IMPACT."
Several
months later, Bell filed this action against the board of
directors and against the four principal contributing religious
organizations, challenging their expressed reason for ending
the program and terminating his employment. He complained,
in six counts, that the defendants (1) interfered with
his contract, (2) intentionally inflicted on him emotional
distress, (3) breached a covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, (4) interfered with his prospective advantage,
(5) wrongfully terminated him, and (6) that the religious
organization defendants breached their pledge to contribute
to Interfaith Impact on a yearly basis. The district court
dismissed the complaint against the individual board members
for lack of personal jurisdiction and against the religious
organizations because of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
He appeals only on the ground that the district court erred
in determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
II
In
keeping with the First Amendment's proscription against
the "establishment of religion" or prohibiting the"free
exercise thereof," civil courts have long taken care not
to intermeddle in internal ecclesiastical disputes. As early
as Watson v. Jones , 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871)
(decided on general common law and not constitutional law),
the Supreme Court disavowed the ability to resolve a dispute
between a national religious organization and one of its
local churches based on differing interpretations of church
law, reasoning that
All
who unite themselves to...a [religious] body do so with
an implied consent to [its] government, and are
bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent
and would lead to the total subversion of such religious
bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions
could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed.
It is of the essence of these religious unions,
and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision
of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions
should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance,
subject only to such appeals as the organism itself
provides for.
Id.
at 729. And later in Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop,
280 U.S. 1 (1929), the Court similarly refused, on constitutional
grounds, to force a Roman Catholic Archbishop to appoint
the plaintiff to a chaplaincy which was denied to him based
on an interpretation of Roman Catholic canon law. Justice
Brandeis there formulated the rule that "[i]n the absence
of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of
the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical,
although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation
before the secular courts as conclusive, because the parties
in interest made them so by contract or otherwise." Id.
at 16. These principles were applied more recently in Kedroff
v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952), where
the Court refused, again on constitutional grounds, to intervene
into a schism between the Russian Church in America and
the Soviet-era Russian Orthodox Church over church lands,
holding that churches must have the "power to decide for
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church
government as well as those of faith and doctrine." Id.
at 116.
Although
Gonzalez and other cases allowed the possibility
of "`marginal civil court review' under the narrow rubrics
of `fraud' or `collusion' when church tribunals act in bad
faith for secular purposes," the Court in Serbian Eastern
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976),
abandoned any"arbitrariness" exception, moving yet further
from any role for civil courts in ecclesiastical disputes.
Id. at 713. It has thus become established that the
decisions of religious entities about the appointment and
removal of ministers and persons in other positions of similar
theological significance are beyond the ken of civil courts.
Rather, such courts must defer to the decisions of religious
organizations"on matters of discipline, faith, internal
organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law." Id.
The Supreme Court explained,"[I]t is the essence of religious
faith that ecclesiastical decisions are reached and are
to be accepted as matters of faith whether or not rational
or measurable by objective criteria." Id. at 714-15.
The
question that we must resolve in the case before us, therefore,
is whether the dispute between Bell and the four national
churches is an ecclesiastical one about "discipline, faith,
internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or
law," Id. at 713, or whether it is a case in which
we should hold religious organizations liable in civil courts
for "purely secular disputes between third parties and a
particular defendant, albeit a religiously affiliated organization."
General Council on Finance Administration of the United
Methodist Church v. California Superior Court, 439 U.S.
1369, 1373 (1978) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice). We conclude
that the dispute in this case is ecclesiastical.
Bell's
complaint against the four national churches centers on
the Presbyterian Church's withholding of funding and its
consultation with the other constituent churches in effecting
a complete reduction of force of Interfaith Impact. Bell
argues that the motives of these churches were not as benign
as simply withdrawing financial support. He has alleged
that board members were improperly focusing on taking over
the Interfaith Impact ministry, or on his personal life,
or on unjustified claims of financial misconduct. At bottom,
however, Bell's challenge focuses on how the constituent
churches spend their religious outreach funds. While it
is possible that the Presbyterian Church may have harbored
hostility against Bell personally, it is also possible that
the church may have been acting in good faith to fulfill
its discernment of the divine will for its ministry. Resolution
of such an accusation would interpose the judiciary into
the Presbyterian Church's decisions, as well as the decisions
of the other constituent churches, relating to how and by
whom they spread their message and specifically their decision
to select their outreach ministry through the granting or
withholding of funds.
Bell
argues that he is not challenging the internal decisions
of the national churches but their external conduct in interfering
with his relationship with Interfaith Impact. He characterizes
this as a secular dispute between the churches and a third
party. This argument, however, overlooks Interfaith Impact's
role as the joint ministry of its constituent churches and
Bell's role as executive director of Interfaith Impact.
Interfaith
Impact is not a secular organization with which the national
constituent churches had a secular relationship. On the
contrary, Interfaith Impact constituted a ministry of those
constituent churches, and this was understood by all persons
involved. The national churches maintain that they were
engaging in ministry as directed by scripture, relying on
Deuteronomy 15:11; Proverbs 21:3; Isaiah
49:6, 58:10; Amos 5:22-24; and Matthew 5:14-16,
which they read to describe spreading light in the world
and pursuing social justice as core Judeo-Christian values.
Their claim is borne out by the charter of Interfaith Impact
which provides that it is organized "to advance the
jointly shared religious purposes of its members, namely,
to carry out their theological imperative to increase the
possibilities for peace, economic and social justice." Interfaith
Impact's religious purpose is also borne out by Interfaith
Impact's engagement of Bell in its "ministry." Indeed, their
engagement letter to Bell concluded, "We hope this will
be a rewarding ministry for you." Finally, Bell himself
treated his position as a ministry. He obtained approval
from his church to engage as executive director of Interfaith
Impact as part of his ministry, and he agreed to the designation
of part of his salary as a parsonage allowance for tax purposes.
In summary, in carrying out his duties, Bell worked to spread
the shared religious beliefs of Interfaith Impact's constituent
members and to promote their Judeo- Christian values.
As
this court has previously noted, a person is a member of
a religion's clergy "if the employee's primary duties consist
of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision
of a religious order, or supervision or participation in
religious ritual and worship." Rayburn v. General Conference
of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th
Cir. 1985); see also Corporation of Presiding
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 (1987) (recognizing the importance
to the religion's mission of activities run by closely-associated
corporations); E.E.O.C. v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d
455, 461-63 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing Rayburn in case
applying "ministerial exception" to a professor of canon
law); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp.,
929 F.2d 360, 362-63 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding a chaplain
in a religiously-affiliated hospital to be a minister);
E.E.O.C. v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary,
651 F.2d 277, 283 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981) (considering
even non-ordained Baptist seminary faculty to be ministers
for Title VII purposes). In light of this precedent, it
follows that Bell too was serving in a religious ministry
while acting as executive director of Interfaith Impact.
When
the Presbyterian Church decided to withhold its funds from
Interfaith Impact, causing the end of Bell's work at Interfaith
Impact, the Presbyterian Church, as well as the other churches,
made a decision on how it would expend funds raised by the
church for religious purposes, which directly related
to its outreach ministry and Bell's status as a minister.
Such a decision about the nature, extent, administration,
and termination of a religious ministry falls within the
ecclesiastical sphere that the First Amendment protects
from civil court intervention.
For
the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district
court.
AFFIRMED
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